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“Mending Wall” as Tolerance

Hansen

Robert Frost’s “Mending Wall” as an Allegory of Tolerance:
Understanding, Acceptance, and Invitation
Kristina Hansen
Brigham Young University
Lane Fischer’s discussion of the nature of law in Turning Freud Upside Down (2005) describes tolerance as the combination of understanding, acceptance, and invitation to do better. This conceptualization of tolerance is equated to love for the
other. The poem “Mending Wall” by Robert Frost is analyzed as an allegory of tolerance so defined.

Mending Wall

And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbors.”
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
“Why do they make good neighbors? Isn’t it 30
Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall, 35
That wants it down.” I could say “Elves” to him,
But it’s not elves exactly, and I’d rather
He said it for himself. I see him there,
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed. 40
He moves in darkness as it seems to me,
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his father’s saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
He says again, “Good fences make good neighbors.” 45

Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
The work of hunters is another thing:
5
I have come after them and made repair
Where they have left not one stone on a stone,
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,
No one has seen them made or heard them made, 10
But at spring mending-time we find them there.
I let my neighbor know beyond the hill;
And on a day we meet to walk the line
And set the wall between us once again.
We keep the wall between us as we go.
15
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.
And some are loaves and some so nearly balls
We have to use a spell to make them balance:
“Stay where you are until our backs are turned!”
We wear our fingers rough with handling them. 20
Oh, just another kind of outdoor game,
One on a side. It comes to little more:
There where it is we do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
25
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Tolerance (Re)Defined

F

ischer (2005) suggests that tolerance, based on God’s
order of kingdoms as described in the Doctrine and
Covenants sections 76 and 88, is founded on understanding, acceptance, and an invitation to do better. In
Fischer’s model of ecologies of law, organisms relate with
environments according to variable levels of laws, which
they are free to choose. Understanding this concept allows a person “to engage people where they are while simultaneously inviting them to a more adequate law” (p.
49). Fischer explains that although a person may not be
striving to live according to the highest possible order of
law, he or she can still be fulfilled while meeting the demands of lower orders. The variable laws that compose
this model may be fundamentally hierarchical, but humankind’s experiences are nested within these laws in a
neither horizontal nor vertical fashion. Each person has
the opportunity “to live the most adequate laws that they
can abide” (p. 49). Each person’s “tolerance” of the other,
then, is the phenomenological experience of understanding the other in his or her current situation, accepting
and engaging the person, and inviting the other to do
better.
It is through this trifecta of understanding, acceptance,
and invitation that tolerance becomes more than its
synonyms: open-mindedness, lenience, or forbearance.
According to Fischer’s explanation, tolerance moves beyond its common misconception of recognizing and then
overlooking another’s differences to what is appropriately
described as love. Love conceptualized as an understanding, accepting, inviting relationship shared between two
people is ultimately applicable to any meaningful relationship. For example, Rodriguez (2005) explains Erich
Fromm’s position that love is not a feeling, but an attitude—a way of being in the world and with others—a
truly existential quality. For Fromm (1956/1989) respect
is inherent in love if love is defined as “the ability to see
a person as he is, to be aware of his unique quality” (p.
26). This “seeing” and “awareness” sounds remarkably like
Fischer’s understanding and acceptance. Other definitions of love make their equation with tolerance just as
appropriate. Vida (2002) describes love as “an experience
of deep human connection, on an unconscious as well as
conscious level, that involves generosity, recognition, acceptance, and something like forgiveness” (p. 438). If this
“something like forgiveness” is understood as Fischer’s

godlike invitation to do better, rather than a simple absolution of sin, it might be difficult (and unnecessary) to
differentiate between tolerance and love.

an interaction with the other. In short, the poem is an
allegory of tolerance.

Invitation

The title of this poem is important to consider. While
the subsequent lines describe with realistic, vivid imagery
the setting, action, and characters in the poem, the title
suggests a journey together, a common cause. The title
is not simply “Wall,” “Standing Wall,” or “Fallen Wall,”
but “Mending Wall”—almost an invitation for improvement in itself. The title, “Mending Wall,” celebrates the
process of interaction with the other. This is an important element in Frost’s poetry and is inextricably tied to
tolerance and love as defined earlier. Even though many
of Frost’s works rely on inanimate objects in nature for
structure, inevitably it is man’s interaction with nature or
his ecology (such as in mending a wall) that is more important. After all, as Moss (1996) explains,“man is united
with and intricate to nature and the universe” through
process (p. 84).
Frost begins his allegory with the playfully mysterious
description of the mess of stones no longer resembling
the garden fence with the phrase

It is important here to emphasize that the invitation in
tolerance is just that—an enticement or incitement for
positive change. With an invitation, there is no suggestion of force or coercion. Moss (1996) explains Whitehead’s conceptualization of this change as process. He
states, “Process is the universal notion of actual entities
working toward experiencing novelty and reaching the
‘subjective aim’ or satisfaction of its potential as illuminated by God” (p. 72). God is necessary in this ecology
as the ultimate guide, support, and exemplar of self-creation. Whitehead (1929/1978) explains,
God’s role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it
lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. He does not create
the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of
the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of
truth, beauty and goodness. (p. 346)

According to this idea, God’s receptive love works to
bring about goodness and harmony in the universe. This
form of inviting based on “tender patience” is akin to the
tolerance and love described above. Humankind, in this
ecology, is both a receiver of God’s invitation and a partner in his poetry.
Frost’s “Mending Wall”

A different “poet of the world,” Robert Frost (1874–
1963), was a contemporary of Whitehead and artfully
confronted some of the same issues about which Whitehead wrote. The issue of tolerance as described in this
paper is found in Frost’s 1914 poem “Mending Wall.” At
first glance, Frost appears simply to be describing his annual landscaping encounter with his neighbor—an event
that Frost seems to regard as traditional, rather than necessary. Of course, as with most Frost poems, a closer inspection of the work reveals that the setting and activities
detailed in the poem are less important than the social
or philosophical themes. The themes described here—
understanding, acceptance, and invitation—are central
to this colloquial, thoughtful, and tolerant reflection on
2

“Mending Wall” as Tolerance

Hansen

Where they have left not one stone on a stone,
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,
No one has seen them made or heard them made,
But at spring mending-time we find them there.

Mending

The narrator describes this coming together with the
other as
I let my neighbor know beyond the hill;
And on a day we meet to walk the line
And set the wall between us once again.
We keep the wall between us as we go.
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.

It seems important to Frost, here, that although the
two have met together, the wall remains squarely fixed
between them. Pragmatically, this is probably the most
efficient way to mend a wall—working at it from both
sides—but the fact that Frost says both that they “set the
wall between [them] once again,” and that they “keep the
wall between [them] as [they] go,” might suggest that this
arrangement is particularly noteworthy. Does the separation bother Frost? Might the wall here represent a figurative or perceptual barrier of which only Frost is aware?
This separation is contrasted with his use of the words
we and us in lines 13 through 15, suggesting once again
the common process that has brought the two together.
The mending is a joint effort in that the wall and work
are shared, but the two individuals described in this section ultimately work only with “the boulders that have
fallen to each.” If the process of mending could be equated to the development of the self (a comfortable cognitive stretch), such a dialogical conceptualization of the
development of the self might be similar to the postmodern notion of self as described by Moss (1996). Throughout this process of mending, the self is both relational
and momentary. Moss explains Gergen’s suggestion that
“reality is a relative and variable consequent of personal
and social interaction or construction” (p. 95). Construction in this case might mean a very literal building of a
structure, but it seems plausible that this building, or rebuilding, might also be considered both a “personal and
social interaction.”
Lines 18 through 20 include several uses of the words
we and our, suggesting again a shared effort or outcome.
This time, however, the tone is playful, and the reader
can easily imagine the two men looking over their shoulders with pointed fingers threatening the magically balanced stones to “Stay where you are until our backs are

Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.

By not naming the culprit “something” to which he is referring, Frost plays with the reader and allows him or her
to determine what Frost is talking about. The “something”
here is most likely the winter frost, born of groundwater
from the spring and summer and frozen during the cold
winter months. When the springtime sun appears again
to “spill the upper boulders,” the frost, in its nonlove of
the wall, makes gaps. Notice that the frost is the “something there is that doesn’t love a wall.” Perhaps, in this
case, frost might just as appropriately be replaced by Frost.
Individuality and Commonality

After a moment’s clarification about what the narrator
really means when he’s talking about the gaps in the wall,
the poet enters a section of the poem that captures both
the individuality of the two characters in the work and
their mending process:
The work of hunters is another thing:
I have come after them and made repair
3
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Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.

By not naming the culprit “something” to which he is referring, Frost plays with the reader and allows him or her
to determine what Frost is talking about. The “something”
here is most likely the winter frost, born of groundwater
from the spring and summer and frozen during the cold
winter months. When the springtime sun appears again
to “spill the upper boulders,” the frost, in its nonlove of
the wall, makes gaps. Notice that the frost is the “something there is that doesn’t love a wall.” Perhaps, in this
case, frost might just as appropriately be replaced by Frost.
Individuality and Commonality

After a moment’s clarification about what the narrator
really means when he’s talking about the gaps in the wall,
the poet enters a section of the poem that captures both
the individuality of the two characters in the work and
their mending process:
The work of hunters is another thing:
I have come after them and made repair
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turned!” Carse (1986) explains that “to be playful is not
to be trivial or frivolous, or to act as though nothing of
consequence will happen” (n.p.). He suggests that playfulness allows relation as free persons, open to surprise.
In this type of relationship, “everything that happens is of
consequence” (n.p.). Lines 21 through 27, however, grow
philosophically more serious while shrouded by Frostlike good humor. Describing the process again Frost says,

voice of possibilities, the voice of mischief, and even the
voice of insight. In lines 28 through 38 he states:
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
“Why do they make good neighbors? Isn’t it
Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That wants it down.” I could say “Elves” to him,
But it’s not elves exactly, and I’d rather
He said it for himself.

Oh, just another kind of outdoor game,
One on a side. It comes to little more:
There where it is we do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbors.”

Frost has created a narrator who demonstrates an uncanny amount of thoughtfulness and curiosity surrounding
his neighbor’s maxim. The narrator wants to understand
the other (“Why do they make good neighbors?”), by inviting the neighbor to reconsider his own statement. Although in line 29 the narrator wonders about his ability
“to put a notion in his [neighbor’s] head,” by line 38 he
admits that what he really wants is for his friend to raise
his thoughts to a higher (and ultimately more playful)
order of thinking. This inviting coincides with Carse’s
proposal that “to be playful is to allow for possibility”
(1986, n.p.) The narrator recognizes that he could force
the issue and, just to be funny, suggest “elves” as the tiny
sprites who tear down walls. Alternately, he could castigate his neighbor for being so close-minded or mechanical that he is willing to spend an entire day each year rebuilding an unnecessary wall for some unknown reason
(“Isn’t it / Where there are cows? But here there are no
cows. / Before I built a wall I’d ask to know / What I was
walling in or walling out”). He could take offense at the
idea that an inanimate, unfeeling wall might actually be
a better neighbor than he is. But instead, he chooses to
invite his friend to enlarge, to examine, and to consider.
His playfulness invites possibility.
The final lines of the poem tie nicely to Moss’s (1996)
concept of acceptance and peace:

In this section of the poem, both characters use personification to distance themselves from the true meaning of
their words. The author states outright that the wall is
not needed. Frost uses tongue-in-cheek banter to refer
to hypothetical rascals who might try to steal and eat
apples fallen from his orchard trees by jokingly reassuring his friend that his own trees are unlikely to poach the
valueless pinecones off of the forest floor of his friend’s
property. It seems in this section that the narrator of
the poem is not committed to any defined ends, but to
the process itself, which he sees as having nonutilitarian
value: “There where it is we do not need the wall.” The
boundary is clearly defined and the trees are unlikely to
mingle, so the building of the wall is essentially an “outdoor game.” To this suggestion, however, the other recites
his father’s cliché, “Good fences make good neighbors.” It
is here that the narrator’s understanding and acceptance
are exemplified.
Understanding, Acceptance, and Invitation

With instantaneous understanding, the narrator’s reaction to the neighbor’s cliché is to invite him to do better. In this case, the “better” might be explained as more
imaginative, more creative, or more playful. Carse (1986)
maintains that “we are playful when we engage others at
the level of choice” (n.p.). With evidence of his desire for
engagement with the other, Frost’s narrator does not give
up easily; he tries again to tempt his neighbor to enter
into the fictive world with him and to share his experience of play. In this section, the narrator becomes the

“Mending Wall” as Tolerance

Hansen

understanding the darkness in which this neighbor man
moves, by accepting him as he is, and by acknowledging and encouraging his potential for betterment. This
consciously integrated understanding coupled with the
process of mending results in peace.
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He moves in darkness as it seems to me,
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his father’s saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
He says again, “Good fences make good neighbors.”
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A positive interpretation of the final two lines admits
that this short, trite statement is still fairly clever. And
while it doesn’t allow for much process, the fact that the
narrator can recognize that his neighbor is pleased with
himself and enjoys his little truism suggests that the narrator may see some value in this observation in itself and
that this value is enough on which to ponder. The poem
ends not in a lack of hope, but in a willingness of the
narrator to accept the neighbor as he is and acknowledge his friend’s reasons for choosing, as Fischer might
put it, the most adequate law that he can abide. This acknowledgement then, or practice of tolerance as defined
as understanding, acceptance, and invitation, emerges as
the poem’s central tenet. The wall itself is trivial, but the
process of mending is invaluable.
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Peace as described by Whitehead becomes the hallmark
of the mentally healthy—understanding the tragic element of life and consciously integrating it, along with elements of beauty, into a changing harmony. . . . Peace, the
acceptance of life and the life processes, is the defining
quality. (p. 114)

According to Moss’s and Whitehead’s above definition,
Frost’s narrator exemplifies this peace and acceptance by
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Value Conflicts in Psychotherapy
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Psychotherapy has historically been viewed as value neutral; however, over the last half-century, developments have led many
scholars to conclude that we can no longer dismiss the role of values in therapy. Our position is that therapists and clients will
inevitably encounter value conflicts during the course of psychotherapy. This article postulates how such conflicts can be addressed so as to preserve and promote the integrity and well-being of both client and clinician. We review challenges to value
neutrality and summarize ethical considerations. We discuss strategies to manage values in psychotherapy and conclude by
recommending areas for consideration in professional training.

P

sychology has had a longstanding goal of developing an objective, unbiased understanding of human
beings. In the same vein, the profession’s understanding
of psychological dysfunction and treatment has been
based on a positivistic philosophy with its accompanying
empirical epistemology. Although therapists have their
own values and beliefs, they have been expected to suspend those in therapy and adopt a position of neutrality.
However, many philosophers (Gadamer, 2004; Tjeltveit,
1999) now doubt the viability of the idea that therapists
can somehow suspend their values. These scholars contend that therapist and client values are inescapable in
therapy. However, this need not impede therapy. We
will suggest that the value conflicts inherent in therapy
are important and can be utilized to promote positive
change if managed appropriately and ethically.
Ethical guidelines alone do not direct the negotiation
of delicate issues often involved in value conflicts. An example of this is the recent lawsuit filed against Eastern
Michigan University by a student who was expelled from
the school’s counseling graduate program for refusing,
on religious grounds, to counsel gay and lesbian clients
(DeSantis, 2012; see also Mintz et al., 2009). This case

highlights the need for strategies to address and manage
value differences in therapy.
This paper will provide a working definition for values
as well as a historical background of influential psychology theories and how those theories include or disregard
the role of values in therapy. Value neutrality is a dominant theme, and we will challenge that notion and emphasize the role of values in psychotherapy along with
inherent ethical considerations. We will conclude with
recommendations for professional training as a way to
manage value conflicts as they arise in therapy.
What We Mean by “Values”

In order to understand the role of values in psychotherapy, we must first understand the definitions of values
used by those in the field and the implications these definitions have for therapy. Rokeach (1973) suggests that
values, as differentiated from attitudes and interests, are the
foundational commitments upon which attitudes and inDirect correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Aaron P.
Jackson, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602. Contact
aaron_jackson@byu.edu.
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terests are based. He defines a value as “an enduring belief
that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence
is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (p. 5).
According to Beutler and Bergan (1991), “value connotes
both a prescriptive (what is good and should occur) and
a proscriptive (what is bad and should not occur) judgment regarding the target of one’s attitude” (p. 7). Similarly, Heilman and Witztum (1997) suggest that values
be viewed as “judgments (based on behavioral, cognitive,
and affective appraisals) as to what is good (what ought
to be) and what is bad (what ought to be avoided)” (p.
524). Schwartz (1992) defines values as “1) Concepts or
beliefs, which 2) pertain to desirable end-states of behaviors, that 3) transcend specific situations, 4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior” (p. 4). Jensen and Bergin
(1988) build on Rokeach’s (1973) definition by describing therapist values regarding therapy as a set of “orienting beliefs about what is good and bad for clients and
how that good can be achieved” (p. 290). In writing specifically about the role of values in counseling psychology,
Mintz et al. (2009) build on Schwartz’s (1992) definition
by adding that these “orienting beliefs about what is good
and desirable . . . guide behavior across professional counseling psychology roles and interactions” (p. 8). Thus
values can be understood as core beliefs that provide a
moral guide for human action across multiple contexts.

mirror, show them nothing but what is shown to him”
(p. 118), suggesting that it is not only possible, but also
desirable for the therapist’s personal attitudes to be kept
out of therapy.
Furthermore, Skinner (1971) felt that the behavior
modification techniques he advocated were “ethically
neutral,” saying, “There is nothing in a methodology
which determines the values governing it use” (p. 150).
For Skinner, values were superfluous to core elements of
behaviorism, as the goodness or badness of a behavior
was derived not from a moral assessment, but from the
contingencies of reinforcement. Thus, the advent of behaviorism reinforced the notion of value-free therapy.
Later humanistic psychologies broke from earlier theories by rejecting the view of the therapist as an objective,
neutral scientist, and instead held that the therapeutic
relationship with a genuine, involved counselor was essential for therapeutic change. However, this subjective
involvement did not extend to the inclusion of therapist
beliefs or values in the interactions. Instead, Carl Rogers (1951) held that therapists should “assume . . . the internal frame of reference of the client” and “lay aside all
perceptions from the external frame of reference while
doing so” (p. 29). In essence, all of the major schools of
psychological thought that existed in the middle of the
twentieth century advocated either a value-neutral approach to psychotherapy.

Historical Background

The Debate About Value Neutrality

In its early years, psychology attempted to model itself
after the natural sciences, which included adopting the
physical sciences’ methods of inquiry and emphasis on
objective, value-free theory, investigation, and practice.
Because of its apparent independence from subjective
beliefs, scientific knowledge was believed to be trustworthy, while personal values and beliefs were viewed as
hazardous to the process of inquiry. This led the field of
psychology to view psychotherapy from its inception as
a fundamentally technical enterprise in which therapists
applied scientific knowledge to client problems. Given
this view, the human experiences, values, and commitments of therapists were seen as either irrelevant or potentially harmful. For example, Freud (1912/1964) likened the work of a therapist to that of a “surgeon who
puts aside all his feelings” (p. 115) and asserted that a
therapist should “be opaque to his patients, and like a

Both theoretical writing and data-based research have
called into question the tenability of a value-free strategy
for counseling. Some scholars have begun to question the
notion of value neutrality and conceptualize therapy as
a value-laden enterprise. As Fisher-Smith (1999) states,
“Values are the bedrock upon which therapeutic decisions are made” (p. 12). Ethical concerns have also been
raised about the influence of values in therapy, and this
has led to further discussions on appropriate and ethical
value management for therapists (cf. Mintz et al., 2009).
Some have suggested that the impact of counselors’ values can still be avoided by having the counselor bracket
or suspend his or her values in therapy and by leaving the
determination of therapeutic goals to the client. Tjeltveit (2006) finds several problems with this solution. For
example, client symptoms may interfere with a client’s
ability to effectively choose therapeutic goals. In prac7
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tice, therapeutic goals are typically determined by the
therapist and client in collaboration. However, Tjeltveit
notes that even if clients are allowed to independently
choose their own therapy goals, such a practice—which
he terms liberal individualism—is still rooted in a value. By
valuing the clients’ choosing their own treatment goals,
the therapist has imposed a value and a treatment goal.
No matter who chooses the goals, the therapist has foundational beliefs about what constitutes positive mental
health for clients, which is inherently a value judgment.
We must also recognize that tolerance and respect for client autonomy are both values as well. In essence, values
underlie our very definition of healthy, normal, or welladjusted states of being and are at the core of psychological theories themselves.
Others have suggested that values can be avoided simply by implementing a given scientific method. However,
scientific methods and their underlying assumptions are
themselves based on certain values and beliefs and preclude other assumptions. The problem is aptly summarized by Slife and Williams (1995).

therapists’ ratings of improvement but not with clients’
ratings or with standardized measures of symptom improvement.
The relationship between initial value similarity and
therapeutic outcome also appears to be mixed. The types
of values on which the therapists are matched seem to
be at least as important as the degree of similarity and
dissimilarity within those values. Arizmendi, Beutler,
Shanfield, Crago, and Hagaman (1985) find that “a complex pattern of similarities and differences in specific values promote maximal improvement” (p. 16). Kelly and
Strupp (1992) find that religiously oriented values appeared to function differently than other values and suggest that religion could be investigated as a trait on which
therapists and clients are specifically matched in order to
improve outcome. Martinez (1991) finds that both clients and therapists tended to rate client improvement
higher when the therapists’ religious orientation was
more conservative theologically than the clients’ and that
the clients’ ratings of their own improvement in therapy
was correlated with initial dissimilarity in religious values. When referring to this change in values, Tjeltveit
(1986) prefers the term value conversion to value convergence because, as Schwen and Schau (1990) discovered,
counselor values tend to remain stable over the course of
therapy while client values show significantly less stability. The idea of therapists converting clients, of course,
contradicts several values traditionally held by the profession, such as respect for client autonomy, and it raises
ethical issues regarding how values should be managed.
Given that empirical data consistently demonstrates that
value conversion does in fact occur, it would be naïve to
ignore or discount the impact of values on the counseling
process.

Objectivity calls for the scientist to achieve some grounds
from which to observe that are independent of, or shielded from, all subjective influences . . .. Because subjective
influences—values, emotions—are essential to the very
identity of the scientist as a person, and because our history, culture, and so forth are often held implicitly rather than explicitly, it seems unlikely that we would ever
achieve this kind of objective ground . . .. . (p. 193)

Over the past several decades, a considerable body of
research has provided evidence that client values undergo
a shift during the course of therapy to become more like
those of the counselor, a phenomenon that has come to
be known as value convergence. This seems to occur outside the conscious intent or control of the therapist, leading Kelly (1990) to conclude that “therapists do not remain value-free even when they intend to do so” (p. 171).
Furthermore, value convergence seems to occur most
notably when there is an initial dissimilarity between
counselor and client (Kelly, 1990; Beutler, Arizmendi,
Crago, Shanfiled, & Hagaman, 1983) and has been
consistently linked with ratings of client improvement.
However, while an earlier study (Beutler, Pollack, & Jobe,
1978) shows that clients rate their global improvement
higher when they adopt their therapists’ point of view to
a greater degree, a later review article (Kelly, 1990) finds
that value convergence is significantly associated with

Ethical Considerations

Because of added attention to the issue of values in
counseling, value-neutral approaches are increasingly
seen as untenable (Bergin, Payne, & Richards, 1996) and
perhaps even undesirable. However, this raises ethical
questions for many therapists. The influence of therapist
values appears to be a threat to psychology’s core commitments of client autonomy and respect for differences
as articulated in the American Psychological Association (APA) (2002) code of ethics. Five general principles
summarize these core values, of which Principles D and
8
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E specifically address therapist “biases” (which necessarily
stem from values) as harmful elements of psychotherapy
(APA, 2002). APA’s admonition “to eliminate the effect
. . . of biases” on professional work seems to echo the traditional notion of value neutrality. The possibility that
values are affecting psychologists’ work seems to challenge the fundamental ethical concerns of protecting client rights and reducing unjust or unfair influence stemming from therapists’ beliefs and attitudes.
However, Principle A (Beneficence and Nonmaleficence) asserts that “psychologists strive to benefit those
with whom they work” and “seek to safeguard the welfare
and rights of those with whom they interact professionally” (APA, 2002). Tjeltveit (2006) argues that any argument of beneficence rests on value judgments about what
constitutes a good outcome, as opposed to a bad one, and
that psychologists may differ among themselves on what
they consider to be a good outcome. Principle A does not
clarify whose definition of beneficence takes priority or
how therapists should resolve conflicts that arise when
the goals of clients conflict with the goals of therapists.
Thus, even a principle as fundamental as beneficence is
laden with value issues that present ethical concerns.
Other ethical questions arise from the possibility of
value conversion in therapy. Tjeltveit (1986) identified
the following as possible ethical issues: the reduction of
client freedom, failure to provide clients with informed
consent, violation of the therapeutic contract, and therapist incompetence in effecting such conversation. Regarding this last issue, Vachon and Agresti (1992) stated,
“Because research has provided evidence of the therapists’
values affecting their clients’ choice of values, it is imperative that psychologists know how to work with both
their own values and the values of their clients in order to
practice ethically” (p. 510). While ethical discussions are
important in raising concerns and shaping professional
practices, it is clear that existing ethical guidelines alone
do not offer sufficient direction on how best to navigate
these delicate issues. A primary concern is how to ethically manage values in counseling to minimize the threat
of therapist values on client freedom and autonomy.

aged in therapy. We will outline several different strategies, with the understanding that much work remains to
be done in addressing this important issue.
Separating Professional Values from Personal
Values

While counselors can certainly be expected as human
beings to have personal feelings about what constitutes
desirable behavior, they can also be expected as psychology professionals to have professional beliefs about what
constitutes psychological well-being and what outcomes
are desirable for clients who are experiencing emotional
distress. The ethical threat personal belief systems pose
can be minimized if personal feelings can be distinguished from professional beliefs. This way, therapists
may still draw upon values, if only professional ones, to
guide therapy. Williams and Levitt (2007) coined the
term value atomization to describe this strategy (p. 160).
They suggest a morally relativistic stance (p. ??) in which
therapists attempt to situate themselves within their
clients’ values and guide therapy according to those values. They interviewed 14 therapists and found that they
would challenge client values only when they felt that
such values would hinder therapeutic progress or when
the clients’ values differed sharply from their own views
of positive mental health. Furthermore, some of the therapists explained that they would directly and explicitly
disclose their values to their clients in order to encourage
the clients to explore their own values.
Strupp (1980) suggested that practitioners share essential therapeutic values (professional values) as opposed
to idiosyncratic values, which are unique to the individual
therapist and can be kept out of the therapeutic encounter. For Strupp, this reduces the issue of indoctrination
and other ethical ills associated with value convergence.
Strupp held that “to the extent that the therapist’s commitment to essential therapeutic values is realized, a
number of issues that are frequently discussed in the
therapy literature become more or less irrelevant” (p.
400). These issues include gender, sexual values, religious
beliefs, and other characteristics. Tjeltveit (1986, 1999)
similarly felt that an ethical method for managing values might include a distinction between values directly
relevant to the counseling process (such as a belief that
depressive symptoms are undesirable and ought to be
reduced) and other irrelevant beliefs (including religious
and political values).

Strategies for Managing Values in Therapy

Despite a growing consensus that values are an inescapable part of psychotherapy, there is considerably less
agreement about how values should be ethically man9
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themselves based on certain values and beliefs and preclude other assumptions. The problem is aptly summarized by Slife and Williams (1995).
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A value atomization approach assumes that a set of
professional values that are fairly consistent across practitioners can guide the process of therapy. Jensen and
Bergin (1988) explored this notion and found they could
group values into 10 themes: (1) perception and expression of feelings; (2) freedom, autonomy, and responsibility; (3) coping and work satisfaction; (4) self-awareness
and growth; (5) interpersonal and family relatedness;
(6) physical fitness; (7) mature values; (8) forgiveness;
(9) sexual regulation and fulfillment; and (10) religiosity
and spirituality. They found a high degree of consensus
among the professionals surveyed that the first 7 factors
were important for mentally healthy lifestyles, somewhat
less consensus about the importance of forgiveness, and
even less consensus about the importance of sexual regulation and religiosity. They further found that therapists’
personal characteristics and theoretical orientation influenced their views of the 10 values. Their research questions the viability of any consensus around a comprehensive core of therapist values.
Furthermore, some writers have suggested that value
atomization is neither tenable nor desirable because values are meaningfully interconnected in complex ways,
and therapists cannot be expected to tease apart which
values are mental health related and which are not (Fisher-Smith, 1999). It may be that mental health values are
interwoven with other values, including those that are
more obviously of a moral or ethical nature (Slife et al.,
2003, Slife, 2004). Tjeltveit (2006) concedes this point:
“It may in some instances be impossible to change health
values without also changing moral, religious or political
values” (p. 519). If this is the case, the central problem
of knowing how and when it is ethically appropriate for
the therapist to influence the values of the client remains
unresolved. As O’Donahue (1989) opines, “The results
of our efforts to understand and help other human beings are a function of our entire web of beliefs” (p. 1468).
Thus all of therapists’ beliefs, not just professional ones,
may be relevant to our work as therapists.

ences in values and reduce covert value convergence by
making implicit values explicit. However, Lewis (1984)
found that subjects in her study had a more negative
impression of therapists about whom they had received
value information, suggesting that clients may feel more
negatively toward counselors whose value positions are
disclosed prior to the start of therapy. Given the desire
to enhance client autonomy, some therapists may still
feel that, despite its potential negatives, self-disclosure
remains the most ethical and philosophically consistent
choice.
Fisher-Smith (1999) interviewed practicing psychologists about values management in their sessions and
found that therapists tend to adopt either a disclosure
mode (as described above) or a neutrality mode, where they
attempt to suspend or put aside their own values and beliefs in favor of those of their clients. Regardless of the
method of managing values, Fisher-Smith found that all
of the therapists interviewed share values of individualism (described as authenticity, agency, and autonomy),
and want to promote clients’ inner sense of self and their
ability to make independent decisions and manage their
own lives.
Referring Clients to Therapists with Similar Values

Tjeltveit (1986) proposed that matching clients with
counselors prior to therapy, particularly in areas such as
religion, would increase the likelihood of positive outcomes. However, Propst (1992) found that religious clients had positive outcomes with non-religious therapists
when the therapists had been trained in religious values
and religiously oriented therapeutic techniques, which
suggests that therapists’ ability to respect and understand religious values is the critical variable in outcome
rather than personal religious similarity, per se. While
matching client and counselor values may appear to have
merit, empirical literature does not demonstrate that
value similarity between client and counselor improves
treatment outcome considerably. In fact, some of the literature seems to suggest that the opposite is true, and
that dissimilarity actually predicts greater improvement
(Beutler et al., 1983; Kelly, 1990). Also, for many clients,
therapist matching may not be an option due to logistical constraints (e.g., size of practice, locale, insurance requirements, etc.).

Disclosing Personal Values

A commonly discussed alternative to either neutrality or value atomization is for therapists to be explicit
about their values and openly discuss them with clients,
whether it be prior to therapy, during therapy, or both
(Bergin, 1980, 1985; Giglio, 1993; Slife, 2004). Such selfdisclosure can be a way to open a dialogue about differ10
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Adjusting Therapeutic Goals

Our perspective on addressing the issue of value conflicts is more radical than those we have reviewed. We
see a need for a comprehensive overhaul in the way that
(a) psychotherapists are trained and (b) psychotherapy is
presented to the public.
First, we believe that therapists need to be trained to
articulate their values—both therapeutic and personal—and understand the interplay of the two. Williamson (1958), an early counseling psychologist, proposed
that all counselors should be experts at understanding
how values and morality are inherent in counseling. He
stated,

Situations may arise in which the values of the therapist and the values of the client obviously collide. After
all, if all therapist-client pairs shared identical values,
then value convergence would not present the ethical dilemma it does, and disclosure of counselor values would
be unnecessary. As such, Heilman and Witzum (1997)
suggest a value-sensitive approach to therapy because significant value conflicts can change the entire course of
therapy. The value-sensitive approach aims to protect the
larger value-grounded interests of the client, even when
doing so conflicts with typically accepted therapy goals or
the personal values of the therapist. In other words, the
therapists value the client’s values more than their own.
The result is that, at times, therapists may have to settle
for “less than a full resolution of the problem and only
deal with some of its limited symptoms” (Heilman &
Witzum, 1997, p. 524) in order to preserve clients’ value
systems. They illustrate this point with examples of therapy with clients from ultraorthodox Jewish backgrounds,
for whom pursuing goals that reflect the values of the
field, such as open acknowledgment and acceptance of
homosexual feelings, would isolate the clients from their
social and cultural groundings and may cause greater
harm overall than the original problem for which the
client sought treatment. The therapist must understand
and be sensitive to the cultural values the client brings
into therapy and, in some situations, may have to alter
the goals of therapy in order to preserve those values.

I have further argued for making explicit our own value
orientations as individual counselors, not in order that we
may adopt a counselor’s orthodox creed, but rather that
we may responsibly give societal and moral direction to
our individual work. (p. 528)

We concur and suggest that today’s pluralistic society
makes this awareness and articulation even more important. One way to begin to address this need would
be to develop an axiological taxonomy; that is, a system
for articulating therapist values. At the very least, therapists need to be trained to articulate their ontological
and philosophical assumptions and show how they relate to their theory of change, interventions, and evidence
of change. For example, therapists who identify as traditional cognitive-behavioral theorists could articulate
their value system as follows:
1. Ontology
a. the individual mind is the fundamental reality

Seeking Outside Consultation

2. Philosophical Assumptions
a. Autonomy—the mind has the capacity to change
and become more rational and more functional in
its evaluations and assessments
b. Hedonism—happiness, pleasure, and freedom
from symptoms are primary motivators
c. Universalism—there are fundamental laws or
rules of functional, effective thinking that apply
across situations and time
d. Stoicism—the ideal attitude is a reasoned restraint
in expectations and commitments, along with the
capacity to defer gratification

Williams and Levitt (2007) report that several therapists they studied would seek outside consultation or
referral when therapist values and client values were too
different. Some therapists felt that a failure to join the
clients in examining their lives from the clients’ value
system reflected an inadequate understanding or ability
on their part. In addition, Williams and Levitt observe
that the category of values that would be considered sufficiently problematic to initiate a values discussion was
very narrow for some practitioners and much broader for
others. Accordingly, their recommendation is that therapists make greater use of consultation in order to gain
perspective on such differences.

Once psychotherapists have identified a guiding ontological assumption and some fundamental philosophical
assumptions, they can more readily articulate how their
treatment goals and interventions are based in those as-
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sumptions. For example, cognitive-behavioral therapists,
making the assumptions listed above, can readily support
their use of interventions focused on changing thought
patterns to reduce symptoms of anxiety or depression.
Alternatively, psychotherapists with a relational ontology and philosophical assumptions of interdependence,
altruism, contextualism, and Christian love might focus
on the meaning and quality of a client’s relationships as
gauge of their improvement and quality of life. Clients,
once educated about the differences across the various
approaches to psychotherapy, could make more informed
choices about the psychotherapist values they might
want to engage with in therapy.

counseling, which she viewed as helping a homosexual
client engage in an immoral lifestyle (Schmidt, 2010).
Subsequent legal action led to a settlement in which the
student was paid $75,000 (Kraft, 2012).
In 2004, similar situations occurred which prompted
the training director of an APA-accredited counseling
psychology doctoral program to initiate a listserv describing the conflicts the program was encountering with
students strongly desiring not to work with LGBT clients due to religious beliefs. Other posts followed, with
more trainers expressing concern about the consequences of the conflicts between trainees’ personal values and
professional expectations (cf. Mintz et al., 2009).
The idea that trainees prefer to see clients who are
more similar to themselves has received some empirical
support (Teasdale & Hill, 2006). Several studies have
explored clients’ preferences for counselor characteristics,
but few have investigated therapists’ preferences for client
characteristics. Tryon (1986) found that therapists preferred to see clients who were young, attractive, verbal,
intelligent, and successful (YAVIS). No studies specifically investigated the preferences of therapists currently
in training until Teasdale and Hill (2006) used a paired
comparison model to examine preferences for demographic variables as well as “psychological” characteristics. Their findings suggested that students consistently
preferred to see clients with similar attitudes and values
and that psychological mindedness was the trait most
preferred in clients. They speculated that students see
clients with similar values as easier to identify and empathize with than those with different values.
When trainees refuse to work with clients with different values, training programs are presented with a problem, because the field places a high value on providing
services for underserved or marginalized populations
and respecting differences among individuals. Following the 2004 listserv, the training directors who were
involved in the discussions reached several conclusions,
namely that the general standards and codes of the field,
together with a goal to promote social justice, had to
outweigh individual trainees’ values that allowed intolerant or discriminative attitudes to affect their professional roles. They also agreed that increasingly frequent
and complex value conflicts point to a need for greater
guidance for trainers on how to manage these difficult
situations among their own trainees (Mintz et al., 2009).
Mintz et al. (2009) suggested a Counseling Psychology

More Training Considerations

Programs that train new psychologists have particular
interest in how therapists handle value differences and
the gaps between recommendations and actual practice. One of the most striking consistencies found in
the literature on values and psychotherapy is a call for
practitioners to more critically examine their own value
systems and the way these are communicated in therapy
(e.g. Mintz, et al., 2009; Slife, et al., 2003; Tjeltveit, 1986,
2006). Furthermore, therapists are not usually trained in
what Tjeltveit (1999) refers to as ethical acuity, which is
recognizing the value-laden underpinnings of therapy or
the way their own values enter into therapy. Also, therapists are not generally trained to help clients clarify their
own values, despite the recognition of the role that values
play in counseling. Vachon and Agresti (1992) state that
it is a skill to understand how the counseling process is
value laden, and it is possible to teach people this skill.
Training can help practitioners develop the necessary
skills in understanding and clarifying values that will allow them to practice ethically and competently.
Issues of value conflicts have been seen as increasingly
relevant to training programs due to actual experiences
and conflicts between trainees and programs concerning
values management. As noted earlier, Eastern Michigan
University recently terminated a graduate student from
its school psychology program because she refused to
counsel LGBT clients. The student subsequently filed a
lawsuit, which was dismissed. The ruling specified that
instead of exploring options that might allow her to
counsel homosexuals about their relationships, the student insisted that she would not engage in gay-affirming
12
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Model Training Values Statement Addressing Diversity (CPMTVSAD), which would explicate the professional values upon which students’ clinical work should
be based. While they hold that the field should not influence values that relate exclusively to nonprofessional
roles, they argue that the profession can specify expectations for professional roles, even when these expectations
are based on values that trainees themselves may not
share. To illustrate this point, they cited examples from
other fields, such as the debate currently going on about
whether pharmacists should be required to dispense
birth control pills or other medications to which they are
morally opposed.
Mintz et al. (2009) further suggest a value management strategy based on three fundamental skills: (1) understanding the philosophy that undergirds theories and
beliefs, (2) deeply examining and reconciling divergent
perspectives, and (3) recognizing and attending to transcendent values. Kelly and Strupp (1992) also noted that
it might be appropriate for training programs to include
a values sensitization component as part of training to assist
students in increasing both their awareness of their own
values and their ability to deal sensitively with the values
of clients.
Vachon and Agresti (1992) also presented a proposal
for training practitioners to clarify and manage values
during psychotherapy by becoming more aware of not
only individual and group values, but also the values that
underlie therapy interactions and psychological theories
themselves. Their recommendations include the ability
to translate counseling interactions into their implicit
value statements followed by skills in managing these
values in ways that benefit the client. They suggest that
training programs help students not only to clarify personal values, but also to understand the values underlying
theories, techniques, and interventions. They also recommend assisting students in evaluating the value-related
issues at work in various particular cases.

A number of strategies for dealing with value conflicts inherent in counseling have been proposed. These include
(a) learning to separate professional values from personal
values, (b) clarifying implicit values through therapists’
examination of their own value system, (c) disclosing
versus remaining neutral regarding therapists’ personal
values in therapy, (d) referring clients to therapists with
similar values, (e) adjusting therapeutic goals, and (f )
seeking outside consultation. We propose a somewhat
more radical approach that requires psychotherapists to
clarify and articulate their values and training programs
to teach their students to do so. Furthermore, programs
that train new therapists can provide guidance on what
is expected in terms of professional values. The proposals
discussed will hopefully serve as points of departure in
the ongoing and evolving dialogue of professional training values and expectations, with the goal of ultimately
preserving the integrity and well-being of both clients
and clinicians.

Conclusion

Beutler, L. E. (1979). Values, beliefs, religion and the persuasive influence of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 16, 432–440.
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Religious Acculturation and Spirituality in Latter-day Saint
Committed Converts
Kristin Hansen, Laurie Page, Lane Fischer, and Marleen Williams
Brigham Young University
This study examines religious acculturation and spirituality in committed Latter-day Saint (LDS) converts living
in Utah. We conducted a qualitative analysis using interviews from a sample of 20 North American and 20 International Latter-day Saint converts attending or working at Brigham Young University (BYU)—a western LDS
private university—of varying age, time since baptism, and country of origin. Of the 40 converts, 39 were classified
as committed in their LDS religious affiliation using Henri Gooren’s (2007) Conversion Career Model. Based on
our analysis of the interviews, several pertinent themes emerged: converts (1) recognize and choose to acculturate;
(2) report positive changes in identity; (3) report that changes in identity are linked to a relationship with God; (4)
rely on spiritual emotions to acculturate; (5) differ in their “fit” with the LDS religious culture; and (6) demonstrate
a somewhat predictable psychological pattern in how they navigate their new religious culture involving initial
idealization, then potential devaluation, and then integration of prior idealization and devaluation. Both a psychosocial and a spiritual process emerged, and in both cases, acculturation occurred in a relational context—one with
the members of the LDS church and one with God. Although, most converts struggle to find their way in their new
religious culture, their reported relationship with God and their associated spiritual feelings are described as a type
of protective factor that help converts with the psychosocial challenges of the acculturation process.

R

eligious conversion is difficult to define and study.
Researchers have debated its definition since William James wrote The Varieties of Religious Experience in
1902. In the past 60 years, there have been many theoretical pieces written on conversion (e.g., Gooren, 2007,
Lofland, & Stark, 1965; Paloutzian, 1999; Paloutzian,
Richardson, & Rambo, 1999; Rambo, 1993; Snow &
Machalek, 1983; Stark & Finke, 2000;), mainly from
within sociology, psychology, anthropology, and theology.
Rambo (1993) uses the word “process” to describe conversion. While on occasion religious conversion may be
sudden, as was Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus, conversion tends to be mediated over time through
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people, communities, groups, and institutions. Debates
in the literature have moved from a pure context-determined view of conversion, as in the case of brainwashing
where an individual passively takes on a new set of beliefs (Singer, 1979), to studies that have pointed out the
role of volition, or agency, and its need to be considered
in converts’ decisions to commit to new religious beliefs
(Straus, 1979). While studies demonstrate converts’ use
of agency and commitment, conversion does not occur
outside of a social context (Regnerus, Smith, & Smith,
2004); instead, converts use their volition within a social
context. For example, using a theoretical model based on
rational individual choice that depends on the cost of
switching and having the “wrong” religion, Barro, Hwang,
and McCleary (2010) hypothesize that religious conversions are more likely to occur among the more educated
in areas where religious pluralism flourishes and are less
likely to occur in areas with government restrictions on
conversion or a history of Communism. Conversion involves both the use of agency to commit and a context
that encourages convert commitment.
Conversion does not end once an individual has become a member of a particular faith. Following conversion, individuals in a new church community continue
to make decisions about ongoing identity development
and commitment to the new community. In a sense, they
must decide whether or not they will acculturate to the
new religious culture. Gibson (2001) defines acculturation as referring to “changes that take place as a result of
contact with culturally dissimilar people, groups, and
social influences” (as cited in Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010, p. 237).
For converts, post-conversion acceptance in their
chosen religious culture requires that they leave behind
values and cultural practices from their previous culture. Sometimes, converts find previous cultural values
and practices to be of worth to them in spite of having
recently adopted the values and practices of their new
religious culture. Schwartz et al. (2010) refers to this bidimensional view as an interplay between the cultural
values and practices of the heritage culture and the receiving culture. In the case of the new religious convert, the
receiving culture is chosen, unlike a refugee or an asylum
seeker. According to Schwartz et al. (2010), the degree
to which converts acculturate into their receiving culture depends on the dynamic relationship between their
heritage culture’s and their receiving culture’s values and

practices, and how the convert identifies with each cultures.
While acculturation has been studied extensively in individuals living outside of their country of origin (immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, sojourners, international
students, and seasonal farm workers; Sam & Berry, 2006;
Schwartz et al., 2010), in ethnic minorities (Cross, 1991;
Helms, 1990), and among all these groups with a focus
on religious acculturation (e.g., Benson, Sun, Hodge, &
Androff, 2011; Grigoropoulou & Chryssochoou, 2011;
Gungor, Bornstein, & Phalet, 2012; Navara & James,
2005; Russo, 1969), there is little in the literature exploring acculturation within religious communities. In
a study that could suggest the presence of acculturating
converts, Paloutzian (1981) studies the perceived purpose of life in recent converts to an evangelistic movement and found differences depending on proximity to
conversion. Converts of less than one week had a very
high score on this measure compared with converts who
were one week to one month away from conversion.
Interestingly, those who had been converted for longer
than one month scored higher than the one-week to onemonth group and almost as high as the less-than-oneweek group. Paloutzian suggests that this dip reflects “a
period of reassessment of one’s decision to adopt the belief, during which time the convert gains understanding,
reassurance, and stability of the decision” (Paloutzian,
1981, p. 1158). We were interested if this reassessment
period was also reflective of some predictable acculturation pattern that was occurring.
Current Study and Hypotheses

It can be assumed that the new evangelical converts
in Paloutzian’s (1981) study were interacting with a religious community that was influencing their ongoing
assessment of their new religious beliefs, rather than the
shift happening in the individuals independent of the
relational context. Finding little research, we decided to
examine if some predictable patterns could be observed
in studying how converts acculturate to a new religious
faith post-conversion. For example, do they recognize
that they are doing so; do they use conscious choice to
engage in this process; what do they say about their interactions with members of their new church culture; and
do they report changes in their identity both psychologically and spiritually? We decided to look at those con17
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verting to the Latter-day Saint (LDS) religion because
we not only have personal experience with this faith but
we think that it provides a unique environment to study
religious acculturation.
Why does the LDS faith provide a unique environment to study religious acculturation? First, those converting to the LDS faith most often have had little prior
exposure to it (although this has rapidly changed with
the 2008 and 2012 U.S. presidential races but was not
true at the time this study was conducted) and must
acculturate to learn about the LDS faith and culture.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS
church), also known as the Mormon Church, identifies
itself as a Christian, American-born religious faith based
upon the founder Joseph Smith’s self-reported inspired
translation of ancient scripture about Jesus Christ: the
Book of Mormon. While the LDS religion claims to be a
Christian faith, its unique beginnings and some of its beliefs and practices place it outside mainstream Christianity (Shipps, 2000). Although LDS church members assimilated into their American host culture mostly in the
first half of this last century, since the 1960s, they have
resisted the pull to assimilate with mainstream American culture due to the secularization of American culture
and due to their desire to maintain a consistency in their
practices and beliefs (Mauss, 2008). Thus the LDS faith
maintains a relatively distinct culture from mainstream
Christianity.
Second, the uniformity of religious practice and belief makes the LDS church a unique setting to study
acculturation of converts. The LDS church provides
consistent church practices and doctrine throughout the
world because of its top down organizational structure
(Knowlton, 2008) and its underlying value of unity of
belief based on the teachings of Jesus Christ. Beginning
with their baptism (the religious ordinance performed as
a symbol of entrance into their new faith), individuals
converting to the LDS church can attend church anywhere in the world and find members who espouse similar religious practices, such as valuing family, serving others, fasting once a month, and engaging in daily scripture
study and prayer. While practice tends to be uniform, the
local church culture varies from place to place around the
world.
Given this uniformity of religious practice and belief,
we were interested in what themes might emerge following a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews

(Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 1997) across nationalities
as converts join and participate in an already established
community of practicing LDS members. We defined
converts as those not born into the LDS church who
chose to become members or to “convert” by being baptized. The converts we sampled varied in age, which addresses a concern in the literature that current conversion
research does not look at a range of ages (i.e. Gooren,
2007). While religious culture can change across time, we
used a cross-sectional analysis, given the uniformity and
top-down structure of the LDS church. This means that
when we refer to the new convert interviewees, they can
be anywhere from a few months post-conversion to more
than 10 years post-conversion.
We will now describe our methods and the themes
that emerged from our qualitative analysis of the interviews of 39 confessing converts acculturating to the LDS
church. A quantitative approach was also employed to
further analyze one of the themes that emerged from the
qualitative analysis, which will be detailed in the results
section. The discussion has been merged with the results
section to unfold our conclusions in conjunction with
the presentation of the themes.
Method
Participants and Procedures

To gather our participants, we placed flyers across the
Brigham Young University (BYU) campus requesting
research participants that met the following inclusion
criteria: subjects must be aged 17 or older; conversion occurred at the age of 12 or older and was not the result of
a family converting together as a group but was initiated
by the individual; they could not be born into or raised by
an LDS family; and subjects were BYU students or employees. We had a large response to our flyer. Of the 60
calls we received over the course of a month, 40 baptized
members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints were randomly selected and interviewed. Of the
40 selected, 20 were from the United States and Canada
and 20 were from 15 countries outside the United States
and Canada. All participants, at the time of the interview,
were affiliated with BYU as either students or employees.
There were 23 females and 17 males between the ages of
17 and 54 (M=26.6), all residing in or near Provo. One
male was dropped, which we will describe shortly. See
18
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Table 1. Results of Survey Information for Convert Participants
N
39

Total Participants
Gender

Female
Male

23
16

≤ 23
24–30
≥ 31

15
16
8

In college
College degree
Some graduate
Graduate degree

24
6
2
7

Age

Education

Ethnicity

North American Sample
Caucasian American
Latin American
African American
International Sample
South and Middle American
East Asian
Former Soviet bloc

14
3
3
6
6
7

Years Since Baptism

0–2.3
2.4–6.9
7–9.9
10+

10
10
10
9

Family Marital History

Parents married
Parents divorced

28
11

Catholic
Christian, non-Catholic
Non-Christian religion
Atheist, agnostic, “no religion”

10
12
5
12

Prior Religion

19
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Table 1 for a summary of the demographic information
of our sample (N=39). 		
Two undergraduate psychology interviewers from the
same faith were trained in qualitative interview procedures by an experienced interviewer (Hill, Thompson,
& Williams, 1997; Kvale, 1996). In the summer of 2007,
the undergraduate interviewers interviewed the converts
for 30 to 60 minutes using several questions as guides to
increase the consistency of the interviews across participants and allow greater depth in the interviews. See Table 2 for a list of the guiding questions used. Interviewees
were required to give written consent and fill out a brief
demographic questionnaire that provided us with the information in Table 1. In return for their participation, in-

means to classify the converts as committed beyond their
self-report.
After conducting the interviews, we came across
Gooren’s (2007, 2010) conversion career categories. He
proposes, based on James T. Richardson’s (1978) term,
the idea that individuals cycle through different phases of
religious affiliation or have “conversion careers.” Gooren
suggested five possible stages of religious participation:
pre-affiliation, affiliation, conversion, confession, and disaffiliation (see Gooren, 2007).
Using Gooren’s classification, by consensus, two raters classified the converts into stages by requiring at least
three factors for classification in his conversion category
and at least three factors or patterns of rhetoric plus clas-

Table 2. Interview Questions Used to Guide Qualitative Interviews
How did you come to join the LDS church?
Tell me about your conversion experience. What was your previous religious/spiritual culture?
What do you like/dislike about your previous experience before converting?
How is LDS culture similar/different?
Tell me about the process of adapting to the LDS culture?
Was it consistently easy or hard, or did it vary?
Were there parts of your pre-LDS experience that you kept and parts you did not?
How did you make these choices?
How has your thinking changed? Your emotions/feelings? Your behavior?
How do you experience LDS doctrine and LDS culture?
terviewees received $10. Interviews were transcribed and
reviewed for accuracy.

sification in the conversion category for classification in
Gooren’s confession category (see Gooren, 2007 for a detailed explanation of his classification system and definitions of his factors and patterns of rhetoric). Of the 40
converts, 39 were classified in the confession stage, which
occurs when a person has a core member identity and
high participation in the new church community while
demonstrating strong evangelism outside it. One convert
was classified in the disaffiliation stage. The disaffiliated
convert was dropped from the study. The raters agreed
that the findings were unchanged without the disaffiliated convert. This was consistent with the converts selfreport of activity level in the LDS church.

Classification of Converts as Committed

Studying acculturation after religious conversion requires some type of determination about which converts
are truly converted, committed, and engaged in the acculturation process post-conversion. Paloutzian (1999),
in reviewing the literature on personality change and
conversion, suggests that stable changes in goals, behavioral adaptations, and identity in converts are more likely
when conversion is proceeded by an in-depth analysis of
the religious choice rather than when conversion happens
for superficial reasons and with less careful analysis. We
hypothesized that acculturation to a new religion cannot occur outside of an ongoing commitment to the new
religion. While all but one of the converts self-reported
to be active participants in the LDS church, we wanted a

Qualitative Data Analysis: Coding

The researchers examined the participants’ experience
as reported in the semi-structured interviews using a
variation of the Consensual Qualitative Research (CQR)
20
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inductive qualitative analysis (Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 1997). We drew conclusions based on the data via
performing successive readings, engaging with the interview texts, coming to consensus about emerging themes,
and repeating this process multiple times for both the
North American and the international interviews. We
avoided developing clear hypotheses in advance so that
the data collected from the qualitative interviews could
be analyzed with openness. Biases on the part of the researchers were reflected in the interview-guiding questions. We did assume that acculturation was occurring,
but we were unclear about what specific patterns would
emerge and how apparent the role of volition would be.
We were aware that converts would most likely engage
in some idealizing and devaluing rhetoric, but we did not
know to what extent and how. We thought that some
converts would discuss both the role of spirituality in the
process and the positive and negative changes in identity;
however, we were again unclear about how and what specific patterns would emerge. We focused our analysis on
themes that emerged related to the acculturation process
post-conversion and remained aware of our biases. We
took them into account throughout the process so that
we would be open to new themes and themes that contradicted our biases.
Using the previously described qualitative
method, four raters first examined the data of the North
American transcripts independently and then discussed
their ideas until they reached conclusions that all raters
endorsed as representative of the data. After the themes
were identified, the raters discussed specific examples
within each theme to create understanding and develop
generalizations, which revealed comparisons, concept developments, and other relationships. We engaged in this
process four times for the North American transcripts
and then five times for the international transcripts,
replacing two of our North American transcript raters

with two new ones for the international transcripts. Two
raters remained constant throughout the entire analysis.
All raters are committed members of the LDS church by
their own self-report, but each one had different experiences with conversion. For example, one was a convert,
two had been inactive members for several years prior to
recommitting, and two were a lifelong members, one of
whom had been married to a convert. The raters’ different experiences with conversion lessened bias related to
how conversion and acculturation might occur, since we
had all had diverse experiences related to conversion and
acculturation.
Our analysis was completed when we achieved consensus among the raters for both the North American transcripts and the international transcripts. Additionally,
as a validity check, two of the original interviewees were
asked to review our proposed themes for the American
transcripts. Both agreed with the findings. Finally, an independent auditor was asked to review our themes for
both the American and international interviews. Some
changes were made by consensus in three more meetings
to arrive at the present findings.
The results that follow reflect themes that arose in
several (sometimes in most) interviews from the 39 converts from our study (16 were male, 23 were female). The
participants were classified, according to Gooren’s (2007)
classification and by their own report, as being committed to their LDS religious faith and varied from each
other in time since baptism, stage of life, and country or
state of origin.
Results

Several themes emerged from the data with our 39
committed LDS converts related to converts’ recognition of the acculturation process and how they engaged
in the process (see Table 3). These themes included the
following: (1) converts recognize the need to and choose

Table 3: Acculturation Themes from Qualitative Analysis of 39 Committed LDS Converts
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Converts recognize and choose to acculturate.
They report experiencing positive changes in identity.
Converts link changes in identity to relationship with God.
Converts rely on spiritual emotions to acculturate.
They differ in their “fit” with the culture.
They make idealizing, devaluing, and integrating comments in a predictable pattern.
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Table 1 for a summary of the demographic information
of our sample (N=39). 		
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terviewees received $10. Interviews were transcribed and
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Gooren’s confession category (see Gooren, 2007 for a detailed explanation of his classification system and definitions of his factors and patterns of rhetoric). Of the 40
converts, 39 were classified in the confession stage, which
occurs when a person has a core member identity and
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Classification of Converts as Committed
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Qualitative Data Analysis: Coding

The researchers examined the participants’ experience
as reported in the semi-structured interviews using a
variation of the Consensual Qualitative Research (CQR)
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how conversion and acculturation might occur, since we
had all had diverse experiences related to conversion and
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Our analysis was completed when we achieved consensus among the raters for both the North American transcripts and the international transcripts. Additionally,
as a validity check, two of the original interviewees were
asked to review our proposed themes for the American
transcripts. Both agreed with the findings. Finally, an independent auditor was asked to review our themes for
both the American and international interviews. Some
changes were made by consensus in three more meetings
to arrive at the present findings.
The results that follow reflect themes that arose in
several (sometimes in most) interviews from the 39 converts from our study (16 were male, 23 were female). The
participants were classified, according to Gooren’s (2007)
classification and by their own report, as being committed to their LDS religious faith and varied from each
other in time since baptism, stage of life, and country or
state of origin.
Results

Several themes emerged from the data with our 39
committed LDS converts related to converts’ recognition of the acculturation process and how they engaged
in the process (see Table 3). These themes included the
following: (1) converts recognize the need to and choose
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Converts rely on spiritual emotions to acculturate.
They differ in their “fit” with the culture.
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to acculturate; (2) converts report experiencing positive
changes in identity; (3) converts link changes in identity
to relationship with God; (4) converts rely on spiritual
feelings and relationship with God to acculturate; and
(5) converts differ in their “fit” with the culture. A somewhat predictable pattern was revealed in a (6) linguistic
analysis of interviewees’ idealizing, devaluing, and synthesizing (integration of idealizing and devaluing) statements. Converts first idealized their new LDS faith, then
showed potential to devalue it, and then integrated both
their idealized and devalued experiences into a transcendent and integrated understanding.

include improved self-confidence, a shift in internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966), more outward focus (i.e.,
less selfishness, more service-oriented), new positive
ways of thinking by gaining an “eternal perspective,” positive changes in behavior, greater access to emotion and
its healthy expression, improved decision making, and
a heightened awareness of previously felt spiritual emotions or the experience of new ones. These changes were
consistent with changes in goals, behavior, spiritual intelligence, and identity found in the literature on personality changes and conversion (Paloutzian, 1999; Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999). Negative changes
were not reported except for one convert who wanted
to hold onto parts of her old religious identity, such as
wearing a cross (something the LDS church discourages in their focus on Christ’s Resurrection rather than
His death), and another convert who mentioned that he
liked that he was more open-minded prior to joining the
LDS church. Several others reported that they became
less open-minded when they chose to live LDS doctrine
but viewed this as positive because of the psychological
and spiritual benefits. They viewed themselves as closing
out some options (such as not drinking alcohol or watching movies with adult themes) in order to enhance their
spiritual sensitivity. A male Vietnamese convert—eleven
months post-conversion and formerly Buddhist—noticed a shift in internal locus of control and self-confidence that he made post-conversion when he said, “It’s
the way I’m seeing the world, not the world seeing me.”
Converts who become committed not only acculturate but enculturate (see Grusec & Hastings, 2007, p.
547), which is the acculturating individual’s process of
selectively deciding what to keep and what to discard
from the heritage culture and what to acquire from the
receiving culture. This process of sorting out priorities
and values plays an important role in developing an internalized identity, which is associated with a greater internal locus of control (Kalven, 1982) and is consistent
with research that points out that converts who engage in
central processing, or careful consideration, rather than
more peripheral processing, such as persuasion from an
attractive source, tend to experience more enduring attitude change following conversion (see Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999).
Snow and Machalek (1983) observe that converts who
“embrace the convert role” make changes in identity that
allow them to be consistent with their new identity, such

Recognizing the Need to and Choosing to Acculturate

Shore (2002) defined culture as shared meanings,
understandings, or referents held by a group of people
(Shore, 2002; Triandis, 1995). The converts in our study
encountered a new culture with new terminology when
they joined the LDS religious faith. They recognized that
they needed to learn new terminology and new cultural
rules in addition to religious beliefs and doctrine. All of
the converts we interviewed discussed the continuing
change in identity that follows conversion with respect
to beliefs, emotions, behaviors, and inner construction of
self in relation to doctrinal learning and encounters with
the receiving culture. While many of our converts commented on the new terms they encountered, many also
commented that the learning they did was a “process.” For
example, a male convert from Mongolia who is 10 years
post-conversion noted, “[I was] not just converted completely. It was a process.” We viewed the challenges with
terminology and the description of what they were doing
as a process, as evidences of the converts’ acknowledgement of acculturating.
Not only did converts acculturate, but they also perceived themselves as consciously choosing to do so and
gave multiple evidences of such. For example, a male
Caucasian North American who is 8 years post-conversion stated, in reference to giving up swearing and drinking coffee, “When it came down to it, [it] was my choice .
. . that I could do it, and it was mine to make.”
Positive Changes in Identity

Converts spontaneously report positive changes in
identity when asked how their thoughts, feelings, and behavior changed post-conversion. Their reported changes
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as changing their autobiographical history and refocusing their sense of meaning and purpose around a master
attribution scheme. While it could be argued that the
converts report mainly positive changes in identity as a
way to be consistent with their newfound convert identity, we did notice genuineness in the converts’ enthusiasm
that seemed to be centered on a “real” relationship with
God. In other words, converts felt that God had intervened in their lives, and this intervention was the source
of their changes in identity.

was seen consistently with all the committed converts.
For example, a Latino American female who is 7 years
post-conversion relied on spiritual emotion to resolve a
conflict: “I just turn to the Lord with it . . . I seek the
Spirit and pray . . . The spirit will confirm it to me, or
I’ll feel bad if I don’t do the right thing; but never is it
because someone else thinks it’s the right thing for me
. . . I try to never base my decisions on what other people think.” The convert is describing an ability to access
spiritual feelings. A Caucasian American male 35 years
who is post-conversion noted, “You see new converts . . .
if they are not accepted and welcomed, many times they
fall away. On the other hand, we socialize people, but if
they don’t have a spiritual conversion [an experience feeling the Spirit] and a firm testimony then they may not
last either.”
We saw a spiritual process at work in acculturation in
LDS converts. In a sense, the converts were not acculturating alone but described themselves as having the help
of “God” or “Jesus Christ” or “the Spirit” in the process.
Memories of spiritual emotions or feelings gave converts
a spiritual perspective that grounded their decisions to
continue to acculturate and make changes in identity.
We have labeled this spiritual perspective-taking. With their
newfound relationship with God and spiritual perspective, converts gained a new view of reality that enhanced
their ability to acculturate in spite of some of the psychosocial challenges they faced. This is consistent with Emmons’ (2000) use of the idea that converts might have an
underlying spiritual intelligence that draws them to conversion or that through conversion they have an opportunity to increase spiritual intelligence (Emmons, 2000;
Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999) and the idea
that religious transformation, given through religious/
spiritual teachings and resources, can give the convert a
new sense of meaning and life purpose (Emmons, 1999;
Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003).

Changes in Identity Are Linked to a Relationship
with God

Many converts talked spontaneously about the role
of their relationship with God in the changes they had
made in their identity post-conversion. For those who
previously had a relationship with God, their attachment
to God seemed to be restructured. Those with no prior
relationship described their newfound relationship with
or attachment to God. In both cases, they consistently
attributed these changes to a real relationship with God.
They considered God to be an actor in their lives.
For example, a Russian male who is 5 years post-conversion reported losing an undesirable self-consciousness: “I guess I didn’t think so much of what other people
thought of me [post-conversion] because I knew my
Heavenly Father was thinking of me as His son and that
He made me the way He wanted to make me.” A male
Caucasian North American who is 35 years post-conversion talked about how his relationship with God has
changed his feelings and life.
When I came out of the waters of baptism I felt completely clean. When I was confirmed I was filled head to
toe with warmth, with love, and I knew that a Father had
accepted my repentance and my efforts to keep the commandments . . . So your feelings change in the sense that
one goes from insignificance to someone the Lord has
died for, which changes your life.

Degree of Fit

Reliance on Spiritual Emotion to Acculturate

We asked converts about how they adapted to the
LDS church post-conversion. Most of the converts fell
into one of two categories. For some, belief systems were
familiar, but the culture seemed strange. For example,
a former “Christian who attended Catholic school”—a
North American female who is 5 years post-conversion—stated, “It’s the social culture that’s been a little
awkward, but spiritual culture fits perfectly.” For others

In the context of a real relationship with God, converts described having spiritual emotions or “feeling
the Spirit.” Some reported having had past experiences
with these feelings, and others seemed to discover them
upon conversion. Converts frequently mentioned their
reliance on their spiritual emotions or feelings as giving
them strength in the acculturation process. This pattern
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to acculturate; (2) converts report experiencing positive
changes in identity; (3) converts link changes in identity
to relationship with God; (4) converts rely on spiritual
feelings and relationship with God to acculturate; and
(5) converts differ in their “fit” with the culture. A somewhat predictable pattern was revealed in a (6) linguistic
analysis of interviewees’ idealizing, devaluing, and synthesizing (integration of idealizing and devaluing) statements. Converts first idealized their new LDS faith, then
showed potential to devalue it, and then integrated both
their idealized and devalued experiences into a transcendent and integrated understanding.
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ways of thinking by gaining an “eternal perspective,” positive changes in behavior, greater access to emotion and
its healthy expression, improved decision making, and
a heightened awareness of previously felt spiritual emotions or the experience of new ones. These changes were
consistent with changes in goals, behavior, spiritual intelligence, and identity found in the literature on personality changes and conversion (Paloutzian, 1999; Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999). Negative changes
were not reported except for one convert who wanted
to hold onto parts of her old religious identity, such as
wearing a cross (something the LDS church discourages in their focus on Christ’s Resurrection rather than
His death), and another convert who mentioned that he
liked that he was more open-minded prior to joining the
LDS church. Several others reported that they became
less open-minded when they chose to live LDS doctrine
but viewed this as positive because of the psychological
and spiritual benefits. They viewed themselves as closing
out some options (such as not drinking alcohol or watching movies with adult themes) in order to enhance their
spiritual sensitivity. A male Vietnamese convert—eleven
months post-conversion and formerly Buddhist—noticed a shift in internal locus of control and self-confidence that he made post-conversion when he said, “It’s
the way I’m seeing the world, not the world seeing me.”
Converts who become committed not only acculturate but enculturate (see Grusec & Hastings, 2007, p.
547), which is the acculturating individual’s process of
selectively deciding what to keep and what to discard
from the heritage culture and what to acquire from the
receiving culture. This process of sorting out priorities
and values plays an important role in developing an internalized identity, which is associated with a greater internal locus of control (Kalven, 1982) and is consistent
with research that points out that converts who engage in
central processing, or careful consideration, rather than
more peripheral processing, such as persuasion from an
attractive source, tend to experience more enduring attitude change following conversion (see Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999).
Snow and Machalek (1983) observe that converts who
“embrace the convert role” make changes in identity that
allow them to be consistent with their new identity, such
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understandings, or referents held by a group of people
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encountered a new culture with new terminology when
they joined the LDS religious faith. They recognized that
they needed to learn new terminology and new cultural
rules in addition to religious beliefs and doctrine. All of
the converts we interviewed discussed the continuing
change in identity that follows conversion with respect
to beliefs, emotions, behaviors, and inner construction of
self in relation to doctrinal learning and encounters with
the receiving culture. While many of our converts commented on the new terms they encountered, many also
commented that the learning they did was a “process.” For
example, a male convert from Mongolia who is 10 years
post-conversion noted, “[I was] not just converted completely. It was a process.” We viewed the challenges with
terminology and the description of what they were doing
as a process, as evidences of the converts’ acknowledgement of acculturating.
Not only did converts acculturate, but they also perceived themselves as consciously choosing to do so and
gave multiple evidences of such. For example, a male
Caucasian North American who is 8 years post-conversion stated, in reference to giving up swearing and drinking coffee, “When it came down to it, [it] was my choice .
. . that I could do it, and it was mine to make.”
Positive Changes in Identity
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as changing their autobiographical history and refocusing their sense of meaning and purpose around a master
attribution scheme. While it could be argued that the
converts report mainly positive changes in identity as a
way to be consistent with their newfound convert identity, we did notice genuineness in the converts’ enthusiasm
that seemed to be centered on a “real” relationship with
God. In other words, converts felt that God had intervened in their lives, and this intervention was the source
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was seen consistently with all the committed converts.
For example, a Latino American female who is 7 years
post-conversion relied on spiritual emotion to resolve a
conflict: “I just turn to the Lord with it . . . I seek the
Spirit and pray . . . The spirit will confirm it to me, or
I’ll feel bad if I don’t do the right thing; but never is it
because someone else thinks it’s the right thing for me
. . . I try to never base my decisions on what other people think.” The convert is describing an ability to access
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who is post-conversion noted, “You see new converts . . .
if they are not accepted and welcomed, many times they
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their ability to acculturate in spite of some of the psychosocial challenges they faced. This is consistent with Emmons’ (2000) use of the idea that converts might have an
underlying spiritual intelligence that draws them to conversion or that through conversion they have an opportunity to increase spiritual intelligence (Emmons, 2000;
Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999) and the idea
that religious transformation, given through religious/
spiritual teachings and resources, can give the convert a
new sense of meaning and life purpose (Emmons, 1999;
Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003).
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with God

Many converts talked spontaneously about the role
of their relationship with God in the changes they had
made in their identity post-conversion. For those who
previously had a relationship with God, their attachment
to God seemed to be restructured. Those with no prior
relationship described their newfound relationship with
or attachment to God. In both cases, they consistently
attributed these changes to a real relationship with God.
They considered God to be an actor in their lives.
For example, a Russian male who is 5 years post-conversion reported losing an undesirable self-consciousness: “I guess I didn’t think so much of what other people
thought of me [post-conversion] because I knew my
Heavenly Father was thinking of me as His son and that
He made me the way He wanted to make me.” A male
Caucasian North American who is 35 years post-conversion talked about how his relationship with God has
changed his feelings and life.
When I came out of the waters of baptism I felt completely clean. When I was confirmed I was filled head to
toe with warmth, with love, and I knew that a Father had
accepted my repentance and my efforts to keep the commandments . . . So your feelings change in the sense that
one goes from insignificance to someone the Lord has
died for, which changes your life.
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We asked converts about how they adapted to the
LDS church post-conversion. Most of the converts fell
into one of two categories. For some, belief systems were
familiar, but the culture seemed strange. For example,
a former “Christian who attended Catholic school”—a
North American female who is 5 years post-conversion—stated, “It’s the social culture that’s been a little
awkward, but spiritual culture fits perfectly.” For others
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the Spirit.” Some reported having had past experiences
with these feelings, and others seemed to discover them
upon conversion. Converts frequently mentioned their
reliance on their spiritual emotions or feelings as giving
them strength in the acculturation process. This pattern
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(including many of the international converts), both
culture and beliefs seemed comfortable. A male convert
from Nepal who is two months post-conversion stated,
“In fact, the way of life at BYU [referring to the LDS
standards of modest dress, chastity, and refraining from
alcohol, coffee, and drugs]—it’s kind of the same life and
society as ours.” Many obstacles to adapting that they
described were decreasing anger, avoiding obscenities,
giving up coffee and tea, keeping the Sabbath day holy,
avoiding R-rated movies, and being more loving to nonLDS family members who were not supportive of their
decision to convert.
The converts described three different relationships
with the receiving culture. The first entailed a bicultural
identification where the convert had embraced the LDS
culture without losing his or her heritage-culture identification. For example, a male North American Caucasian—35 years post-conversion and formerly Catholic—explained, “I don’t feel like I shed anything or left
who I was or my background or my family or any of my
upbringing. Granted, I changed a religious belief system
and practice. I didn’t go to Mass and wasn’t ritualistic
anymore, so I left that part behind. But everything else
I carried on.”
The second relationship with the receiving culture suggested a lack of fit with the receiving culture but also a
sense of no longer belonging to the heritage culture. For
example, a female Caucasian North American who is 5
years post-conversion reported, “It’s hard because I feel
like I don’t fit into the Evangelical faith anymore . . . I
could never go back, but here [at BYU] I feel different all
the time, and so I don’t fit either way.”
Some converts simply rejected their past altogether,
fully embracing their new LDS receiving culture. A male
Caucasian North American, 8 years post-conversion and
formerly Lutheran, explained, “Outright I would say everything did change—who I was before and who I was
after is a complete transformation.”
Degree of fit with the LDS culture did not seem to
influence converts’ desire to continue to commit to identity development and acculturation, which points to the
idea that converts were not simply acculturating to LDS
culture but had a relationship with God and with LDS
beliefs. Interestingly, a recent Pew Forum on Religious
and Public Life survey (2012) found that 59% of LDS
converts write the LDS “beliefs” as their reason for converting when asked to answer why they have converted

in their own words. Again, this suggests converts’ engagement in central rather than peripheral processing and in
elaboration (Paloutzian, 1999; Paloutzian, Richardson,
& Rambo, 1999) as they acculturate and commit to their
new religious faith.
Patterns of Acculturation

While converts attributed their conversion and desire
for continued acculturation to the LDS faith to their
spiritual experiences, their relationship with God, and
LDS beliefs, the converts’ conversions occurred in the
context of human relationships. Regardless of the uniformity in belief and practice, the LDS community members’ backgrounds and attitudes are more heterogeneous
then converts may at first realize. There are subtle differences within different congregations depending upon the
geographical location, the number of members in an area,
or the degree to which LDS converts are in the majority
or minority. As converts acculturated, they encountered
LDS members with varying degrees of understanding of
LDS beliefs and members who were motivated by an extrinsic rather than an intrinsic religiosity (see Allport &
Ross, 1967).
As converts both acculturated and enculturated, they
would sometimes idealize the membership and at other
times devalue those they met in the receiving culture. In
the interviews, we observed converts needing to make
choices between receiving culture and heritage culture
values when these values were in conflict. Many of the
converts made comments that integrated idealizing and
devaluing perspectives, showing an appreciation of the
complexity of interacting with others who are also trying
to interpret and practice a system of beliefs. To track if
any patterns emerged from idealizing, devaluing, and integrating commentary and converts’ time from baptism,
we identified and scored this commentary. We will first
provide examples of each of these three types of commentary and then present the pattern that emerged in
a quantitative analysis based on the converts’ time from
baptism.
Idealizing the receiving culture and devaluing the
heritage culture. We noted that 30 of our 39 committed converts made idealizing comments about the LDS
church or its members. These comments were made
while either describing their conversion experiences or
their feelings at the time of the interview. For example,
a male Vietnamese convert, 11 months post-conversion
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and formerly Buddhist, stated, “The people that I’m
meeting are really, really friendly and very nice. And the
doctrine is the same from everywhere, and that’s unique.
I realize everyone has the same doctrine and talks about
it the same way.” A female North American who is 5
years post-conversion stated, “My friend says, it’s not just
me, seriously Church members are just like that and then
I found out it was right . . . there was something about
him, very charismatic but there was more than that; he
had a kind of happiness.”
Idealizing comments sometimes went hand in hand
with converts’ devaluing of their heritage culture. For example, a female Ukrainian convert who is eight months
post-conversion stated, “A lot of people, most of my
friends actually, would be . . . saying that you’re Orthodox or Catholic but not doing anything for it, like they
weren’t even going to church or doing anything with no
standards or no moral values. So, I didn’t like that.” Inappropriate sexual behavior, substance abuse, dishonesty,
lack of interpersonal connection, and selfishness were
some of the common behaviors and attitudes that they
devalued in their heritage culture.
Additionally, as part of idealizing the LDS culture,
some converts commented on their perceived inadequacy relative to LDS church members. A female Russian
convert, 5 years post-conversion and previously Catholic,
devalued herself relative to her lifelong-LDS BYU classmates who grew up learning LDS doctrine: “I felt embarrassed in my classes when everyone would raise their
hands and answer questions . . . I was just sitting there. I
was like, why did I join; like there’s no way; I could never
keep up with someone who went to seminary [LDS religious education for adolescents] . . . I don’t know any of
this knowledge.”
Devaluing the receiving culture and missing the
heritage culture. Devaluing comments about the LDS
church or its members were made by 29 converts. Devaluing comments reflected the convert’s disappointment
with some aspects of LDS culture that followed an initial
idealistic assessment of the culture. A female Caucasian
American convert who is 5 years post-conversion reported the following:

stop being my friend . . . If I’m just different in my speech
or language or approach . . . I feel almost discriminated
against because I am a convert here.

Just as devaluing one’s heritage culture occurred with
idealizing the receiving culture, missing aspects of one’s
heritage culture occurred with devaluing the receiving
culture. For example, the same convert as above showed
this most clearly,
Sometimes it makes me sad because sometimes I’ll forget things about my old faith that are really, really good
things to remember. Like one day I was in the car. I was
listening to . . . the Christian station . . . and there is this
one song that said something about the name . . . I was
like, “Oh, I totally forgot.” As an Evangelical Christian we
are all about the name of Christ saving you.

Integrating comments reflect recognition of the tendency to idealize and devalue. In our sample, 34 of our
39 converts interviewed had at least one integrating comment in their transcript. Integrating comments show
how a convert’s understanding transcends idealization
and devaluation. Such statements usually demonstrated
accepting the LDS beliefs along with recognizing that
not all LDS members are practicing a particular belief or
interpreting the beliefs in the same manner. It also demonstrated the converts’ ability to integrate former aspects
of their identity with those parts that they chose to adopt
from the LDS religion. For example, a male Caucasian
North American, previously Catholic and 35 years postconversion, stated, “I think the core of who a person is—
their background and culture—is completely accepted
and welcomed in the gospel. There is no limit on one’s
culture or one’s background. You don’t leave that behind
when you join, and in fact that’s the beauty of the gospel;
it encompasses people all over the world, for it truly is no
respecter of persons.”
A male Korean convert, 8 years post-conversion and
formerly culturally Buddhist, stated, “All of the members
of the church want to follow the example of Jesus Christ
and live the gospel and LDS doctrine, but you know not
all the members are active and obedient. So some members might not follow the doctrine, but they want to, and
some people do not want to. And some people cannot
follow.” This same convert further demonstrated how he
integrated the LDS faith and culture with his previous
Buddhist culture: “I think there are some similar features,
similar attributes between LDS culture and Korean cul-

People here [at BYU] tend to think I’m not a member
because I wear a cross. [Like the LDS church members],
I don’t worship it; it’s just a cross . . . but then they try and
become my friend real quick and to try and get me baptized. And then they realize I am a member and then they
25
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(including many of the international converts), both
culture and beliefs seemed comfortable. A male convert
from Nepal who is two months post-conversion stated,
“In fact, the way of life at BYU [referring to the LDS
standards of modest dress, chastity, and refraining from
alcohol, coffee, and drugs]—it’s kind of the same life and
society as ours.” Many obstacles to adapting that they
described were decreasing anger, avoiding obscenities,
giving up coffee and tea, keeping the Sabbath day holy,
avoiding R-rated movies, and being more loving to nonLDS family members who were not supportive of their
decision to convert.
The converts described three different relationships
with the receiving culture. The first entailed a bicultural
identification where the convert had embraced the LDS
culture without losing his or her heritage-culture identification. For example, a male North American Caucasian—35 years post-conversion and formerly Catholic—explained, “I don’t feel like I shed anything or left
who I was or my background or my family or any of my
upbringing. Granted, I changed a religious belief system
and practice. I didn’t go to Mass and wasn’t ritualistic
anymore, so I left that part behind. But everything else
I carried on.”
The second relationship with the receiving culture suggested a lack of fit with the receiving culture but also a
sense of no longer belonging to the heritage culture. For
example, a female Caucasian North American who is 5
years post-conversion reported, “It’s hard because I feel
like I don’t fit into the Evangelical faith anymore . . . I
could never go back, but here [at BYU] I feel different all
the time, and so I don’t fit either way.”
Some converts simply rejected their past altogether,
fully embracing their new LDS receiving culture. A male
Caucasian North American, 8 years post-conversion and
formerly Lutheran, explained, “Outright I would say everything did change—who I was before and who I was
after is a complete transformation.”
Degree of fit with the LDS culture did not seem to
influence converts’ desire to continue to commit to identity development and acculturation, which points to the
idea that converts were not simply acculturating to LDS
culture but had a relationship with God and with LDS
beliefs. Interestingly, a recent Pew Forum on Religious
and Public Life survey (2012) found that 59% of LDS
converts write the LDS “beliefs” as their reason for converting when asked to answer why they have converted

in their own words. Again, this suggests converts’ engagement in central rather than peripheral processing and in
elaboration (Paloutzian, 1999; Paloutzian, Richardson,
& Rambo, 1999) as they acculturate and commit to their
new religious faith.
Patterns of Acculturation

While converts attributed their conversion and desire
for continued acculturation to the LDS faith to their
spiritual experiences, their relationship with God, and
LDS beliefs, the converts’ conversions occurred in the
context of human relationships. Regardless of the uniformity in belief and practice, the LDS community members’ backgrounds and attitudes are more heterogeneous
then converts may at first realize. There are subtle differences within different congregations depending upon the
geographical location, the number of members in an area,
or the degree to which LDS converts are in the majority
or minority. As converts acculturated, they encountered
LDS members with varying degrees of understanding of
LDS beliefs and members who were motivated by an extrinsic rather than an intrinsic religiosity (see Allport &
Ross, 1967).
As converts both acculturated and enculturated, they
would sometimes idealize the membership and at other
times devalue those they met in the receiving culture. In
the interviews, we observed converts needing to make
choices between receiving culture and heritage culture
values when these values were in conflict. Many of the
converts made comments that integrated idealizing and
devaluing perspectives, showing an appreciation of the
complexity of interacting with others who are also trying
to interpret and practice a system of beliefs. To track if
any patterns emerged from idealizing, devaluing, and integrating commentary and converts’ time from baptism,
we identified and scored this commentary. We will first
provide examples of each of these three types of commentary and then present the pattern that emerged in
a quantitative analysis based on the converts’ time from
baptism.
Idealizing the receiving culture and devaluing the
heritage culture. We noted that 30 of our 39 committed converts made idealizing comments about the LDS
church or its members. These comments were made
while either describing their conversion experiences or
their feelings at the time of the interview. For example,
a male Vietnamese convert, 11 months post-conversion
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and formerly Buddhist, stated, “The people that I’m
meeting are really, really friendly and very nice. And the
doctrine is the same from everywhere, and that’s unique.
I realize everyone has the same doctrine and talks about
it the same way.” A female North American who is 5
years post-conversion stated, “My friend says, it’s not just
me, seriously Church members are just like that and then
I found out it was right . . . there was something about
him, very charismatic but there was more than that; he
had a kind of happiness.”
Idealizing comments sometimes went hand in hand
with converts’ devaluing of their heritage culture. For example, a female Ukrainian convert who is eight months
post-conversion stated, “A lot of people, most of my
friends actually, would be . . . saying that you’re Orthodox or Catholic but not doing anything for it, like they
weren’t even going to church or doing anything with no
standards or no moral values. So, I didn’t like that.” Inappropriate sexual behavior, substance abuse, dishonesty,
lack of interpersonal connection, and selfishness were
some of the common behaviors and attitudes that they
devalued in their heritage culture.
Additionally, as part of idealizing the LDS culture,
some converts commented on their perceived inadequacy relative to LDS church members. A female Russian
convert, 5 years post-conversion and previously Catholic,
devalued herself relative to her lifelong-LDS BYU classmates who grew up learning LDS doctrine: “I felt embarrassed in my classes when everyone would raise their
hands and answer questions . . . I was just sitting there. I
was like, why did I join; like there’s no way; I could never
keep up with someone who went to seminary [LDS religious education for adolescents] . . . I don’t know any of
this knowledge.”
Devaluing the receiving culture and missing the
heritage culture. Devaluing comments about the LDS
church or its members were made by 29 converts. Devaluing comments reflected the convert’s disappointment
with some aspects of LDS culture that followed an initial
idealistic assessment of the culture. A female Caucasian
American convert who is 5 years post-conversion reported the following:

stop being my friend . . . If I’m just different in my speech
or language or approach . . . I feel almost discriminated
against because I am a convert here.

Just as devaluing one’s heritage culture occurred with
idealizing the receiving culture, missing aspects of one’s
heritage culture occurred with devaluing the receiving
culture. For example, the same convert as above showed
this most clearly,
Sometimes it makes me sad because sometimes I’ll forget things about my old faith that are really, really good
things to remember. Like one day I was in the car. I was
listening to . . . the Christian station . . . and there is this
one song that said something about the name . . . I was
like, “Oh, I totally forgot.” As an Evangelical Christian we
are all about the name of Christ saving you.

Integrating comments reflect recognition of the tendency to idealize and devalue. In our sample, 34 of our
39 converts interviewed had at least one integrating comment in their transcript. Integrating comments show
how a convert’s understanding transcends idealization
and devaluation. Such statements usually demonstrated
accepting the LDS beliefs along with recognizing that
not all LDS members are practicing a particular belief or
interpreting the beliefs in the same manner. It also demonstrated the converts’ ability to integrate former aspects
of their identity with those parts that they chose to adopt
from the LDS religion. For example, a male Caucasian
North American, previously Catholic and 35 years postconversion, stated, “I think the core of who a person is—
their background and culture—is completely accepted
and welcomed in the gospel. There is no limit on one’s
culture or one’s background. You don’t leave that behind
when you join, and in fact that’s the beauty of the gospel;
it encompasses people all over the world, for it truly is no
respecter of persons.”
A male Korean convert, 8 years post-conversion and
formerly culturally Buddhist, stated, “All of the members
of the church want to follow the example of Jesus Christ
and live the gospel and LDS doctrine, but you know not
all the members are active and obedient. So some members might not follow the doctrine, but they want to, and
some people do not want to. And some people cannot
follow.” This same convert further demonstrated how he
integrated the LDS faith and culture with his previous
Buddhist culture: “I think there are some similar features,
similar attributes between LDS culture and Korean cul-

People here [at BYU] tend to think I’m not a member
because I wear a cross. [Like the LDS church members],
I don’t worship it; it’s just a cross . . . but then they try and
become my friend real quick and to try and get me baptized. And then they realize I am a member and then they
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Figure 1. Mean idealizing score by groups (time from
baptism)

ture . . . like obedience to older people. In Korea we emphasize the humility, being humble.”
Pattern observed based on converts’ idealizing, devaluing, and integrating comments. To analyze the patterns of idealizing, devaluing, and integrating comments,
two raters gave a score to each convert on the following
basis. A convert was given a “0” for no idealizing, devaluing, or integrating comments, a “1” for some, and a “2” for
a high amount of idealizing, devaluing, and integrating
comments relative to both the convert’s own use of these
three types of comments and the entire sample’s use of
these types of comments. Scores were used since a simple count of the number of comments was prohibited by
comments that varied in length and comments that were
brought up multiple times in the interview. Once scores
were tabulated, 39 participants’ interviews were divided
into four almost-equal groups of varying time from baptism (0–2.3 years, 2.4–6.9 years, 7–9.9 years, and 10+
years; see Table 1).
Although the sample sizes were small, we conducted
exploratory quantitative analyses. We used the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test to estimate whether there
were significant differences among the four groups in
terms of each of the three outcome variables (idealizing, devaluing, integrating). Significant differences were
found among the groups in terms of idealizing (p =
0.003) and integrating (p = 0.009) but not in terms of devaluing (p = 0.064). Given the significant findings of the
nonparametric tests and the need to run post-hoc tests,
we determined that a parametric test would be used to
further explore the source of the significant differences.
Three ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc tests were conducted. Overall, significant differences were found between the groups in terms of idealizing (p = 0.001) and
integrating (p = 0.005) with a trend toward significance
for devaluing (p = 0.057). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed
that group 1 was significantly higher in idealizing comments than group 2 (p.< 0.006) and group 4 (p.< 0.002).
Group 1 was significantly lower in integrating comments
than group 2 (p.< 0.037), group 3 (p.< 0.009), and group
4 (p.< 0.013) (see Figures 1–3).
While further analysis should be done with a larger
sample size, our findings indicate that converts 0–2.3
years are going through a significantly different process,
including making more idealizing and less integrating
comments, than converts who have been in the church
longer. While only a trend, there is some indication that
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Figure 2. Mean devaluing score by groups (time from
baptism)
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Figure 3. Mean integrating score by groups (time from
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converts roughly 2.4–6.9 years in the church may be going through a devaluing phase given that they make more
devaluing comments than those converts 0–2.3 years and
10+ years in the church. While converts make integrating comments as early as 0–2.3 years after baptism, it
appears that converts make significantly more integrating comments after approximately 7 years in the church.
Converts seem to acculturate to the LDS religion in a
somewhat consistent psychological pattern.
We found that converts exhibited a pattern of psychological identity development that was related to their
interactions within their new religious culture. They predictably began by idealizing it. When they encountered
inconsistences between belief and practice or when they
encountered LDS members who professed beliefs that
are not reflected in the LDS core teachings or that result
from a lack of knowledge of core doctrine, they began devaluing members of the majority LDS culture. Some felt
devalued themselves or found that some of their cherished values and beliefs were not valued, understood, or
considered within the majority mainstream LDS culture.
These observed inconsistencies led to a reassessment
and, in the case of committed converts, recommitment
to their new faith.
Although this study was conducted in Utah, converts
did not seem to be reacting specifically to “Utah” LDS
culture. While the converts saw it as different from LDS
culture elsewhere, they displayed a range of both positive and negative experiences with it, which reflects that
the psychological and spiritual patterns observed are not
simply about acculturation to Utah LDS culture. Additionally, converts reported several experiences they had
with LDS church culture prior to living in Utah that gave
evidence of the idealizing, devaluing, and integrating pattern. However, the patterns observed in this study may
have some relation to Utah LDS culture being the vehicle for disseminating LDS doctrine around the globe,
given that 78% of lifelong LDS members live in Western
states and 40% in Utah (Pew Forum on Religious and
Public Life Survey 2012).
By choosing to continue to commit to their new faith,
converts must be able to construct an integrated, faithful
LDS identity through synthesizing idealization, disappointment along the journey, and understanding of their
heritage and receiving culture and values. For the committed converts, the acculturation process that they go
through is often viewed as an important trial of their

faith, and they draw upon their relationship with God
and the spiritual emotions they experience throughout
the conversion process. In a sense, converts’ spiritual experiences protect them from the vicissitudes of the acculturation process when connected to their new faith.
Limitations and Future Directions

One limitation relates to our ability to generalize.
Most of our converts converted outside Utah, and they
shared their process of acculturating outside Utah in
their narratives. Given this, we believe that some generalizing across converts can be made. We do so with
caution, however, because all of our converts were living
in Provo, Utah, at the time of the interview, retrospectively recalling their acculturation process. There is also a
limitation in our chosen use of a cross-sectional analysis
(Paloutzian, 1999). Further research could be done in a
longitudinal research design.
Another related limitation is that we have only observed committed converts. It would be useful to conduct
the same study in persons exploring, converting to, or
disaffiliating from the LDS church in comparison to our
sample. When reviewing the transcript of the one disaffiliated convert baptized in Uganda five months prior
to his interview at BYU, we noticed some notable differences. Unlike the committed converts, he was intrigued
by the LDS religion but did not express a relationship
with a transcendent being or any significant spiritual
feelings or emotions that occurred with his conversion.
He also didn’t demonstrate a desire to acculturate to the
LDS faith. His transcript lacked idealizing or integrating comments like the ones our committed converts had.
When asked how he adapted, he stated, “I can’t say I’ve
adapted . . . the Church thing is kind of tolerated; I’m
going to school [at BYU] so I have to tolerate that.” His
cognitive processing appeared to have been more peripheral (Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999). In contrast to the committed converts, the disaffiliated convert
had neither a spiritual nor psychosocial acculturation
experience that seemed integral to the experience of the
committed converts. It would be interesting to see if the
patterns observed in the LDS committed converts and
in the disaffiliated convert would similarly be observed
in committed and disaffiliated converts of other faiths.
A third limitation is that we were unable to discuss
ethnicity and ethnic differences among the international converts with the small sample sizes of international
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Figure 1. Mean idealizing score by groups (time from
baptism)

ture . . . like obedience to older people. In Korea we emphasize the humility, being humble.”
Pattern observed based on converts’ idealizing, devaluing, and integrating comments. To analyze the patterns of idealizing, devaluing, and integrating comments,
two raters gave a score to each convert on the following
basis. A convert was given a “0” for no idealizing, devaluing, or integrating comments, a “1” for some, and a “2” for
a high amount of idealizing, devaluing, and integrating
comments relative to both the convert’s own use of these
three types of comments and the entire sample’s use of
these types of comments. Scores were used since a simple count of the number of comments was prohibited by
comments that varied in length and comments that were
brought up multiple times in the interview. Once scores
were tabulated, 39 participants’ interviews were divided
into four almost-equal groups of varying time from baptism (0–2.3 years, 2.4–6.9 years, 7–9.9 years, and 10+
years; see Table 1).
Although the sample sizes were small, we conducted
exploratory quantitative analyses. We used the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test to estimate whether there
were significant differences among the four groups in
terms of each of the three outcome variables (idealizing, devaluing, integrating). Significant differences were
found among the groups in terms of idealizing (p =
0.003) and integrating (p = 0.009) but not in terms of devaluing (p = 0.064). Given the significant findings of the
nonparametric tests and the need to run post-hoc tests,
we determined that a parametric test would be used to
further explore the source of the significant differences.
Three ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc tests were conducted. Overall, significant differences were found between the groups in terms of idealizing (p = 0.001) and
integrating (p = 0.005) with a trend toward significance
for devaluing (p = 0.057). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed
that group 1 was significantly higher in idealizing comments than group 2 (p.< 0.006) and group 4 (p.< 0.002).
Group 1 was significantly lower in integrating comments
than group 2 (p.< 0.037), group 3 (p.< 0.009), and group
4 (p.< 0.013) (see Figures 1–3).
While further analysis should be done with a larger
sample size, our findings indicate that converts 0–2.3
years are going through a significantly different process,
including making more idealizing and less integrating
comments, than converts who have been in the church
longer. While only a trend, there is some indication that
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converts roughly 2.4–6.9 years in the church may be going through a devaluing phase given that they make more
devaluing comments than those converts 0–2.3 years and
10+ years in the church. While converts make integrating comments as early as 0–2.3 years after baptism, it
appears that converts make significantly more integrating comments after approximately 7 years in the church.
Converts seem to acculturate to the LDS religion in a
somewhat consistent psychological pattern.
We found that converts exhibited a pattern of psychological identity development that was related to their
interactions within their new religious culture. They predictably began by idealizing it. When they encountered
inconsistences between belief and practice or when they
encountered LDS members who professed beliefs that
are not reflected in the LDS core teachings or that result
from a lack of knowledge of core doctrine, they began devaluing members of the majority LDS culture. Some felt
devalued themselves or found that some of their cherished values and beliefs were not valued, understood, or
considered within the majority mainstream LDS culture.
These observed inconsistencies led to a reassessment
and, in the case of committed converts, recommitment
to their new faith.
Although this study was conducted in Utah, converts
did not seem to be reacting specifically to “Utah” LDS
culture. While the converts saw it as different from LDS
culture elsewhere, they displayed a range of both positive and negative experiences with it, which reflects that
the psychological and spiritual patterns observed are not
simply about acculturation to Utah LDS culture. Additionally, converts reported several experiences they had
with LDS church culture prior to living in Utah that gave
evidence of the idealizing, devaluing, and integrating pattern. However, the patterns observed in this study may
have some relation to Utah LDS culture being the vehicle for disseminating LDS doctrine around the globe,
given that 78% of lifelong LDS members live in Western
states and 40% in Utah (Pew Forum on Religious and
Public Life Survey 2012).
By choosing to continue to commit to their new faith,
converts must be able to construct an integrated, faithful
LDS identity through synthesizing idealization, disappointment along the journey, and understanding of their
heritage and receiving culture and values. For the committed converts, the acculturation process that they go
through is often viewed as an important trial of their

faith, and they draw upon their relationship with God
and the spiritual emotions they experience throughout
the conversion process. In a sense, converts’ spiritual experiences protect them from the vicissitudes of the acculturation process when connected to their new faith.
Limitations and Future Directions

One limitation relates to our ability to generalize.
Most of our converts converted outside Utah, and they
shared their process of acculturating outside Utah in
their narratives. Given this, we believe that some generalizing across converts can be made. We do so with
caution, however, because all of our converts were living
in Provo, Utah, at the time of the interview, retrospectively recalling their acculturation process. There is also a
limitation in our chosen use of a cross-sectional analysis
(Paloutzian, 1999). Further research could be done in a
longitudinal research design.
Another related limitation is that we have only observed committed converts. It would be useful to conduct
the same study in persons exploring, converting to, or
disaffiliating from the LDS church in comparison to our
sample. When reviewing the transcript of the one disaffiliated convert baptized in Uganda five months prior
to his interview at BYU, we noticed some notable differences. Unlike the committed converts, he was intrigued
by the LDS religion but did not express a relationship
with a transcendent being or any significant spiritual
feelings or emotions that occurred with his conversion.
He also didn’t demonstrate a desire to acculturate to the
LDS faith. His transcript lacked idealizing or integrating comments like the ones our committed converts had.
When asked how he adapted, he stated, “I can’t say I’ve
adapted . . . the Church thing is kind of tolerated; I’m
going to school [at BYU] so I have to tolerate that.” His
cognitive processing appeared to have been more peripheral (Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999). In contrast to the committed converts, the disaffiliated convert
had neither a spiritual nor psychosocial acculturation
experience that seemed integral to the experience of the
committed converts. It would be interesting to see if the
patterns observed in the LDS committed converts and
in the disaffiliated convert would similarly be observed
in committed and disaffiliated converts of other faiths.
A third limitation is that we were unable to discuss
ethnicity and ethnic differences among the international converts with the small sample sizes of international
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converts from each country represented. In addition to
using bigger sample sizes from various countries within
our current BYU population, it would also be important
to corroborate our findings by studying LDS samples of
committed LDS converts in different regions. Special attention could be paid to regions where converts are more
of the majority, relative to those born and raised in the
LDS church, versus regions where they are in the minority to see if converts still engage in similar patterns of
idealization, devaluation, and integration.
Additionally, further research could be done to explore
the ways religious communities can help converts develop healthy identities that incorporate both heritage and
receiving culture values and practices. While religions are
meant to strengthen the spirituality of its members, and
the converts interviewed in this study had that experience, more research can be done to understand the psychological experience of new converts and the relational
context in which they find themselves.
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converts from each country represented. In addition to
using bigger sample sizes from various countries within
our current BYU population, it would also be important
to corroborate our findings by studying LDS samples of
committed LDS converts in different regions. Special attention could be paid to regions where converts are more
of the majority, relative to those born and raised in the
LDS church, versus regions where they are in the minority to see if converts still engage in similar patterns of
idealization, devaluation, and integration.
Additionally, further research could be done to explore
the ways religious communities can help converts develop healthy identities that incorporate both heritage and
receiving culture values and practices. While religions are
meant to strengthen the spirituality of its members, and
the converts interviewed in this study had that experience, more research can be done to understand the psychological experience of new converts and the relational
context in which they find themselves.
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Longitudinal Course of Female Eating Disorder Risk at
Brigham Young University
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Brigham Young University
Three cohorts of entering freshman women were assessed over the course of four years at Brigham Young University (BYU).
The Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26) and the Body Shape Questionnaire (BSQ) were administered at the beginning of each
fall and winter semester. Results showed (a) steadily decreasing average levels of eating disorder risk and body shape dissatisfaction over time, which was mirrored in each cohort; (b) significantly lower eating disorder risk than other college samples; (c)
a typically high percentage of women with clinically significant body shape dissatisfaction; (d) significant correlation between
the EAT-26 and the BSQ; and (e) notable subgroups (according to anticipated academic major) of higher-risk students. The
findings suggest that, although body shape dissatisfaction was similar to estimated rates on other college campuses and the
measure thereof was correlated with eating disorder risk, the overall level of eating disorder risk at BYU was lower than that
reported on other college campuses. It is proposed that unique aspects of the BYU campus might mitigate the development of
eating disorders.

R

esearch has indicated that several aspects of college life are associated with increased risk of eating
disorders in female students. For instance, studies of college campuses using the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26)
have shown eating disorder risk rates ranging from 14%
to 17% (Edwards-Hewitt & Gray, 1993; Kirk, Singh, &
Getz, 2001; Prouty, Protinsky, & Canady, 2002; Forney
& Ward, 2013). Further, a recent study by Forney and
Ward (2013) based on the Body Shape Questionnaire
(BSQ) reported a risk rate of 28.7% at a midsized midwestern university ( J. Forney, personal communication,
March 21, 2013). Simon-Boyd and Bieschke (2003) suggested that emphasis on academic achievement, competition, and attractiveness are particularly salient risks to
vulnerable students. Boskind-White and White (1983)
and Prouty et al. (2002) showed that Caucasian, reli-

gious, achievement-oriented females are at particularly
higher risk for developing eating disorders.
Brigham Young University (BYU) is a church-sponsored university whose campus fits these criteria for a
high eating disorder risk among young women. The student body is 86% Caucasian (Brigham Young University,
n.d.). The school has a decidedly religious emphasis with
a scripturally based honor code, a board of trustees primarily composed of ecclesiastical leaders, and a president
who is both the institutional leader and a religious leader
“called” to his position by the board of trustees. The stu-

dent body is 98% Latter-day Saint (LDS). BYU has a
very competitive academic environment with freshmen
admitted in 2012 averaging 28.4 composite ACT scores
and 3.81 high school GPAs (Brigham Young University,
n.d.). It is unclear whether elevated risks at such campuses are “hotbeds” (attracting vulnerable or previously
disordered students) or “breeding grounds” (encouraging the development of disorders in previously healthy
students) for eating disorders. To estimate the comparative degrees of eating disorder risk for females on campus and to determine where to focus prevention efforts,
a research team consisting of Student Life professionals,
faculty, and graduate students conducted a longitudinal
study of three cohorts of entering freshman women using both a measure of body shape dissatisfaction and eating attitudes. Both instruments were administered twice
each year over the course of four years.
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strated that the EAT-26 was highly correlated with the
EAT-40 (r = 0.98). The current researchers calculated
the EAT-26 scores to allow comparison of this sample
to other college samples that were administered only the
EAT-26. The EAT-40 has rendered internal consistency
coefficients of 0.79 for anorexic patients and 0.94 for
control (nondiagnosed) subjects. Mintz and O’Halloran
(2000) showed that the EAT was 90% accurate at differentiating between diagnosed and nondiagnosed collegeage women. The clinical cut score on the EAT-40 is 30.
The clinical cut score on the EAT-26 is 20. Participants
whose scores were above the cut scores were considered
to be at risk for manifesting an eating disorder. The
EAT-40 and EAT-26 are used to support diagnoses of
eating disorders.
The Body Shape Questionnaire (BSQ; Cooper, Taylor, Cooper, & Fairburn, 1987) does not globally measure
eating disorder risk but rather focuses on one important
correlate of eating disorders. It is a “self-report measure of
concerns about body shape, in particular the phenomenal
experience of ‘feeling fat’” (p. 490). Cooper et al. reported
excellent concurrent validity of the BSQ with the Body
Dissatisfaction subscale of the Eating Disorders Inventory (r = 0.66). Rosen, Jones, Ramirez, and Waxman
(1996) reported that the temporal stability of the BSQ
met accepted standards (r = 0.88) and showed excellent
concurrent validity with the Body Dysmorphic Disorder
Examination administered to college-age women (r =
0.77). Participants whose BSQ scores exceeded 110 were
considered to have significant body image concerns.
A demographics questionnaire asked incoming freshmen women to self-report their age, residence, collegiate
sports participation, dance team participation, and anticipated choice of college major. The anticipated majors
were grouped according to similar subject matter and
collapsed by the researchers into 20 major categories
sponsored by the university.

Method
Participants

A new cohort of 1,800 entering freshman women was
randomly selected each year for three successive years.
The three cohorts were assessed at the beginning of each
fall and winter semester for four years, three years, and
two years, respectively. The average age of the women
was 18.2 years with a range of 18-24. The initial response
rate averaged 36% with steady subject mortality over the
course of time. Table 1 indicates the response rates for
each cohort across the four years.
Instruments

The Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-40; Garner & Garfinkel, 1979) was administered to all participants twice
each year. Participants’ risk scores were calculated using
all 40 items on the EAT-40 as well as the subset of 26
items on the EAT-26 recommended by Garner, Olmsted, Bohr, and Garfinkel (1982). Garner et al. demon-

Table 1. Number of Participants in Each Semester, by Group
Freshman
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Psychology and Special Education, 340-L MCKB, BYU, Provo, UT 84602.
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Procedure

tion of the BSQ distributions. Because the BSQ is not
a measure of psychopathology, the reduced skew relative
to the EAT measures was expected. Nevertheless, the
last samples of the BSQ were still significantly skewed.
Rather than report mean values, which are destabilized
in skewed distributions and may misrepresent phenomena, results are reported here in terms of percentages of
students who scored in the clinical range for the EAT
and the BSQ. Because the patterns of risk estimated by
EAT-40 and EAT-26 were very similar, only the EAT-26
results are reported.
The longitudinal course of eating disorder risk and
body dissatisfaction seemed to follow the same trend
across all three cohorts. As seen in Tables 2 and 3, the
percentage of students in clinical (at-risk) ranges steadily
declined over time.
These values were collapsed across all samples and
cohorts to estimate the typical risk according to year
in school. As seen in Table 4, freshman women were at
greatest risk according to both the EAT-26 and the BSQ.
Risk rates steadily declined across year in school.
These data were further collapsed to estimate a single
risk rate of eating disorders for female students on BYU
campus. Estimates were generated in two ways: weighted
and unweighted. The weighted risk rate is based on the
total number of questionnaires completed regardless of
cohort or year in school (N ~ 5700). Because of subject
attrition over time, the weighted risk overrepresents underclassmen, who have higher rates of eating disorder

Each year, for three years, 1,800 incoming freshman
women were randomly selected and mailed the demographics form, the EAT-40, and the BSQ at the beginning of their first fall semester. The instruments were
mailed again at the beginning of the winter semester.
This pattern was repeated at the beginning of fall and
winter semesters for four years. The first cohort was
sampled eight times. The second cohort was sampled six
times. The third cohort was sampled four times. In the
third year of the study, after all participants were enrolled
and familiar with the instruments, the instruments were
e-mailed to participants to decrease the burden of completing hard copies and mailing them back to the research team.
Results

Estimates of psychopathology typically distribute with
significant positive skew. Results of all measures (EAT40, EAT-26, and BSQ) distributed with significant positive skew. Critical Ratio Tests of skew for the EAT measures ranged from 37.6 to 7.4. There was a clear pattern
of decreasing skew over time, which indicates progressive
normalization of the EAT distributions, but the distributions were still significantly skewed. Critical Ratio Tests
of skew for the BSQ ranged from 8.3 to 2.4. As with the
EAT measures, there was a clear pattern of decreasing
skew over time, which indicates progressive normaliza-

Table 2. Percentage of Women in At-Risk Range by Group Based on the EAT-26
Freshman

Sophmore

Junior

Senior

Cohort

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

1
2
3

14.0
12.7
11.3

12.5
11.3
10.8

10.3
9.3
10.1

12.8
8.4
13.7

6.9
8.1

3.9
5.2

7.8

7.8

Table 3. Percentage of Women in At-Risk Range by Group Based on the BSQ
Freshman

Sophmore

Junior

Senior

Cohort

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

1
2
3

34.5
31.8
37.0

32.8
30.9
39.1

31.3
25.8
32.2

30.5
30.8
30.2

20.2
25.3

23.7
25.8

19.2

22.8
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Table 4. Year-In-School Percentage in At-Risk Range Based on the EAT-26 and BSQ
Measure

Freshman

Sophmore

Junior

Senior

EAT-26
BSQ

12.1
33.5

10.8
30.0

6.0
23.8

7.8
21.0

risk. The unweighted risk is based on the average of the
year-in-school averages and compensates for the overrepresentation of underclassmen.
Based on the EAT-26, the single weighted risk rate was
10.8%, and the unweighted risk rate was 9.2%. Singlesample z tests of proportions using the average annual
sample size of 690 showed that both the weighted and
unweighted risk rates were significantly lower than a conservative estimate of 15% based on risk rates recorded on
other college campuses. The z was -3.0 (p = .0013) when
testing against the weighted risk rate of 10.8% and -4.1
(p = .00003) when testing against the unweighted risk
rate of 9.2%.
The single weighted risk rate based on the BSQ was
31.1%, and the unweighted risk rate was 27.2%. Singlesample z tests of proportions using the average annual
sample size of 720 showed that the weighted and unweighted risk rates were not significantly different than a
recent estimate of 28.7 at a midsized midwestern university. The z was 1.4 (p = 0.0808, NS) when testing against
the weighted risk rate of 31.1% and -0.88 (p = 0.1894,
NS) when testing against the unweighted risk rate of
27.2%.
Because of the extreme skews in all distributions, the
estimates of the relationship between the EAT and the
BSQ were based on Spearman’s Rho. Depending on the
point in time or cohort used, coefficients ranged from
0.61 to 0.72 with an average Spearman’s Rho of 0.67.
After considering the overall risk, the research investigated whether there were specific subgroups that represented notably higher risk. Participants were separated
into 20 subgroups according to their anticipated major
in the fall semester of their freshman year. Whether
students maintained those majors over time is undetermined. Subgroups were ranked according to risk, which
was estimated in multiple ways, including mean values,
median values, and percentage of students scoring above
critical cutoffs on the EAT or BSQ. Based on the firstsemester declared major and across multiple estimates,
six subgroups emerged as having notable risk. The six
academic-major groups at higher risk were dance, com-

munications, dietetics, physical education, theater, and
business. The three academic-major groups at lower risk
were engineering/technology, math/science, and biology.
Discussion

Although BYU students possess many of the attributes typically associated with elevated levels of eating
disorder risk, this study shows that BYU female students
displayed significantly lower risk than female students on
other college campuses. Additionally, BYU women entered the university at their highest level of risk in the
fall of their freshman year and then steadily declined
in risk throughout their time on campus. It is notable,
however, that BYU women’s level of body shape dissatisfaction was similar to a trustworthy estimate from
another college campus. This is consistent with Carroll
and Spangler’s (2001) finding that female LDS college
students had body image issues that were similar to their
non-LDS counterparts. Both groups seemed to have
been influenced by the media’s thin ideal. However, in a
subsequent study, Sandberg and Spangler (2007) found
that female LDS college students had lower BSQ scores
than their non-LDS counterparts. Across the three samples, the BYU or LDS women were estimated to have the
same or better body images than non-BYU or non-LDS
women.
Although body shape dissatisfaction is an important
component of eating disorder risk, and the correlations
between the EAT and the BSQ were quite high, the actual level of eating disorder risk for BYU female students
was significantly lower than for female students on other
college campuses. Women who scored high on BSQ
tended to score high on the EAT. However, correlations
ignore mean values and do not estimate actual levels of
risk. In this case the apparently typical high body shape
dissatisfaction did not result in typical levels of eating
disorder risk. In fact, the estimated risks of BYU women’s
eating disorders were significantly lower than expected.
There are several possible explanations for why a college
campus with many of the markers that predict elevated
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Procedure

tion of the BSQ distributions. Because the BSQ is not
a measure of psychopathology, the reduced skew relative
to the EAT measures was expected. Nevertheless, the
last samples of the BSQ were still significantly skewed.
Rather than report mean values, which are destabilized
in skewed distributions and may misrepresent phenomena, results are reported here in terms of percentages of
students who scored in the clinical range for the EAT
and the BSQ. Because the patterns of risk estimated by
EAT-40 and EAT-26 were very similar, only the EAT-26
results are reported.
The longitudinal course of eating disorder risk and
body dissatisfaction seemed to follow the same trend
across all three cohorts. As seen in Tables 2 and 3, the
percentage of students in clinical (at-risk) ranges steadily
declined over time.
These values were collapsed across all samples and
cohorts to estimate the typical risk according to year
in school. As seen in Table 4, freshman women were at
greatest risk according to both the EAT-26 and the BSQ.
Risk rates steadily declined across year in school.
These data were further collapsed to estimate a single
risk rate of eating disorders for female students on BYU
campus. Estimates were generated in two ways: weighted
and unweighted. The weighted risk rate is based on the
total number of questionnaires completed regardless of
cohort or year in school (N ~ 5700). Because of subject
attrition over time, the weighted risk overrepresents underclassmen, who have higher rates of eating disorder

Each year, for three years, 1,800 incoming freshman
women were randomly selected and mailed the demographics form, the EAT-40, and the BSQ at the beginning of their first fall semester. The instruments were
mailed again at the beginning of the winter semester.
This pattern was repeated at the beginning of fall and
winter semesters for four years. The first cohort was
sampled eight times. The second cohort was sampled six
times. The third cohort was sampled four times. In the
third year of the study, after all participants were enrolled
and familiar with the instruments, the instruments were
e-mailed to participants to decrease the burden of completing hard copies and mailing them back to the research team.
Results

Estimates of psychopathology typically distribute with
significant positive skew. Results of all measures (EAT40, EAT-26, and BSQ) distributed with significant positive skew. Critical Ratio Tests of skew for the EAT measures ranged from 37.6 to 7.4. There was a clear pattern
of decreasing skew over time, which indicates progressive
normalization of the EAT distributions, but the distributions were still significantly skewed. Critical Ratio Tests
of skew for the BSQ ranged from 8.3 to 2.4. As with the
EAT measures, there was a clear pattern of decreasing
skew over time, which indicates progressive normaliza-

Table 2. Percentage of Women in At-Risk Range by Group Based on the EAT-26
Freshman

Sophmore

Junior

Senior

Cohort

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

1
2
3

14.0
12.7
11.3

12.5
11.3
10.8

10.3
9.3
10.1

12.8
8.4
13.7

6.9
8.1

3.9
5.2

7.8

7.8

Table 3. Percentage of Women in At-Risk Range by Group Based on the BSQ
Freshman

Sophmore

Junior

Senior

Cohort

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

Fall

Winter

1
2
3

34.5
31.8
37.0

32.8
30.9
39.1

31.3
25.8
32.2

30.5
30.8
30.2

20.2
25.3

23.7
25.8

19.2

22.8
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Table 4. Year-In-School Percentage in At-Risk Range Based on the EAT-26 and BSQ
Measure

Freshman

Sophmore

Junior

Senior

EAT-26
BSQ

12.1
33.5

10.8
30.0

6.0
23.8

7.8
21.0

risk. The unweighted risk is based on the average of the
year-in-school averages and compensates for the overrepresentation of underclassmen.
Based on the EAT-26, the single weighted risk rate was
10.8%, and the unweighted risk rate was 9.2%. Singlesample z tests of proportions using the average annual
sample size of 690 showed that both the weighted and
unweighted risk rates were significantly lower than a conservative estimate of 15% based on risk rates recorded on
other college campuses. The z was -3.0 (p = .0013) when
testing against the weighted risk rate of 10.8% and -4.1
(p = .00003) when testing against the unweighted risk
rate of 9.2%.
The single weighted risk rate based on the BSQ was
31.1%, and the unweighted risk rate was 27.2%. Singlesample z tests of proportions using the average annual
sample size of 720 showed that the weighted and unweighted risk rates were not significantly different than a
recent estimate of 28.7 at a midsized midwestern university. The z was 1.4 (p = 0.0808, NS) when testing against
the weighted risk rate of 31.1% and -0.88 (p = 0.1894,
NS) when testing against the unweighted risk rate of
27.2%.
Because of the extreme skews in all distributions, the
estimates of the relationship between the EAT and the
BSQ were based on Spearman’s Rho. Depending on the
point in time or cohort used, coefficients ranged from
0.61 to 0.72 with an average Spearman’s Rho of 0.67.
After considering the overall risk, the research investigated whether there were specific subgroups that represented notably higher risk. Participants were separated
into 20 subgroups according to their anticipated major
in the fall semester of their freshman year. Whether
students maintained those majors over time is undetermined. Subgroups were ranked according to risk, which
was estimated in multiple ways, including mean values,
median values, and percentage of students scoring above
critical cutoffs on the EAT or BSQ. Based on the firstsemester declared major and across multiple estimates,
six subgroups emerged as having notable risk. The six
academic-major groups at higher risk were dance, com-

munications, dietetics, physical education, theater, and
business. The three academic-major groups at lower risk
were engineering/technology, math/science, and biology.
Discussion

Although BYU students possess many of the attributes typically associated with elevated levels of eating
disorder risk, this study shows that BYU female students
displayed significantly lower risk than female students on
other college campuses. Additionally, BYU women entered the university at their highest level of risk in the
fall of their freshman year and then steadily declined
in risk throughout their time on campus. It is notable,
however, that BYU women’s level of body shape dissatisfaction was similar to a trustworthy estimate from
another college campus. This is consistent with Carroll
and Spangler’s (2001) finding that female LDS college
students had body image issues that were similar to their
non-LDS counterparts. Both groups seemed to have
been influenced by the media’s thin ideal. However, in a
subsequent study, Sandberg and Spangler (2007) found
that female LDS college students had lower BSQ scores
than their non-LDS counterparts. Across the three samples, the BYU or LDS women were estimated to have the
same or better body images than non-BYU or non-LDS
women.
Although body shape dissatisfaction is an important
component of eating disorder risk, and the correlations
between the EAT and the BSQ were quite high, the actual level of eating disorder risk for BYU female students
was significantly lower than for female students on other
college campuses. Women who scored high on BSQ
tended to score high on the EAT. However, correlations
ignore mean values and do not estimate actual levels of
risk. In this case the apparently typical high body shape
dissatisfaction did not result in typical levels of eating
disorder risk. In fact, the estimated risks of BYU women’s
eating disorders were significantly lower than expected.
There are several possible explanations for why a college
campus with many of the markers that predict elevated
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risk for eating disorders would have scores that were lower than expected. One reason may be that Student Life
prevention efforts are effective. Women’s Services and
Resources (WSR) sponsors eating-disorders prevention
programming throughout the school year that addresses
eating and body image problems. All of this programming is under the umbrella of WSR’s yearlong Recapturing Beauty campaign. The campaign includes:

portion sizes, create variety in their meals, and plan
healthy meals, and snacks.
• Lecture Series. Occasionally WSR hosts speakers
who have overcome eating disorders and are willing
to speak about their journey and what approaches
helped them. Speakers address theology regarding
the doctrine of the body, the role of our physical
bodies in our salvation, and the sacred stewardship
of the body. These lectures help students to have a
reverence and healthy respect for the body.

• The 10-Day Body Image Challenge. Held at the
beginning of each school year, this program focuses
on body image. The challenge includes one exercise
each day that encourages students to address the
way they view themselves and helps them develop
a greater love and appreciation for who they are as
divine beings. The exercises shift focus away from
the messages of the world to define beauty from an
internal standard.
• A Week of Mindful Eating. The purpose of this
activity is to educate students about the dangers of
dieting and teach them about intuitive eating, an approach that focuses on being attuned to their bodies
and learning to recognize hunger and satiety signals
rather than being dictated by an external authority
regarding how to eat.
• National Eating Disorders Awareness Week. This
event includes a variety of activities to educate students about eating disorders, including how to recognize the signs and symptoms of eating disorders
and how to help themselves or a loved one who is
dealing with an eating disorder. Activities include an
array of lectures about body image and the media,
media literacy, perfectionism, and self-esteem.
• Fed Up with Food. “Fed Up” is a weekly support
group for students who want to have a healthy view
of themselves and a healthy approach to eating.
Weekly discussions provide participants with skills
to challenge thinking and attitudes that lead to problematic eating and to empower them to be true to
themselves.
• Confidential Consultations. Confidential consultations are available for students struggling with
depression, anxiety, body image issues, or eating
problems. Consultants assess needs and provide information, making referrals to the counseling center
as needed.
• Nutrition Consolations. Nutrition consultations
help students determine healthy eating patterns, and

WSR’s activities are ongoing throughout the school year
and can be reviewed at recapturingbeauty.byu.edu.
Another reason for lower-than-expected eating disorder risk might be BYU’s unique social structure. One of
the ecological factors associated with eating disorder risk
for college-age women is the removal of intimate family
and social support. Leaving home and entering a competitive academic environment without social support can
elicit the onset or exacerbation of eating disorder symptoms (Vohs, Heatherton, & Herrin, 2001). The BYU
experience may be atypical in this regard. All students
are assigned to a geographically based ward (church
congregation). Within the ward system, students have
extensive social support in the form of bishops (pastors), home teachers (males assigned to visit and support specific ward members on a monthly basis), visiting
teachers (females assigned to visit and support specific
female ward members on a monthly basis), home evening
groups (small groups of males and females that meet every Monday evening for activities and shared worship),
weekly congregational worship services, and ward-wide
service and recreational activities on a monthly basis. All
students receive and provide social support for each other through the ward system. The enhanced opportunity
to have satisfying social and interpersonal relationships
may be a protective factor against eating disorder risk.
Another reason for lower-than-expected eating disorder risk might be the predominant doctrine taught in
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS).
In LDS doctrine, the physical body is considered essential for eternal progress and is to be treated with care and
reverence. The concept that the body is sacred and is a receptacle of divine presence is clearly taught. For example,
tattoos are eschewed and considered analogous to writing graffiti on a temple building. Body piercings are to be
avoided. It is not inconceivable that the same logic that
prompts individuals to revere and protect their physi34
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cal bodies would be a protective factor against many of
the outward symptoms of eating disorders. Binging and
purging, laxative abuse, or severe dietary restrictions may
be seen as harmful to the sacred body. Carroll and Spangler (2001) opined that the doctrine of the sacredness
of the body might be more salient for men than women. They also proposed that while the doctrine may be
equally salient for men and women, it could be compromised more for women because of the power of the thin
ideal in the media. Nevertheless, samples show that BYU
females are faring better than non-BYU females, and it
may be due to religious doctrine. There is also very specific scripture within the LDS belief system, called the
Word of Wisdom, that provides both proscriptions and
prescriptions regarding substances that should be avoided and food that should be eaten to enhance spiritual and
physical health. Of course, doctrine can be distorted in
the thoughts of a student suffering from eating disorder
symptoms and ironically used as a rationalization that
perpetuates unhealthy behavior. However, the young
women on BYU campus may be benefitting from the
predominant doctrinal messages within the LDS church.
Another related factor might be addresses by ecclesiastical leaders and publications of the LDS church that
have moved beyond the general doctrine of reverence for
the body to specifically referencing eating disorders. For
example, in the 2001 article “Who Do You Think You
Are?—A Message to Youth,” James E. Faust of the First
Presidency of the LDS church advised:

Thank you for your July 2005 article “The Body, a Sacred
Gift.” For more than seven years an eating disorder has
been the lens through which I see my body. My battle to
turn to the Lord and the healing power of the Atonement
was considerably aided by your article and its timing. I
appreciate your constant sensitivity to today’s problems
and your courage in addressing them. (p. 79)

Another reader wrote in the September 2006 Ensign:
I want to thank you for the article “My Battle with Anorexia.” I had kept my eating disorder secret for a long
time and this article helped me realize that what I was
doing did not coincide with the gospel and hurt me spiritually, though I would have never admitted it. (p. 48)

Any one or a combination of such unique factors in the
BYU ecology may be influencing the diminished risk of
eating disorders on campus. Although it is clear that the
thin-ideal message promulgated by the popular media is
having the same impact on body dissatisfaction of BYU
females as measured by the BSQ, the risk rates of their
self-reported eating disorder symptoms as measured
by the EAT are less than those estimated on other college campuses. Although one or a combination of such
unique factors in the BYU ecology are not completely
effective, as BYU still has a 9% to 10% overall risk and
some subgroups are at higher risk, something in the ecology seems to be blunting the expected risk.
We have speculated about the surprising findings in
this study. Perhaps the most effective design that can explore what ecological factors might be at play will be a
qualitative study utilizing in-depth interviews of BYU
women at the various stages of their academic careers.
There may be developmental processes as well as ecological influences that are only accessible through qualitative
inquiry. Qualitative design can be used for confirmatory
purposes and is not limited to exploration only. Such a
study is strongly recommended.

In your quest to define yourselves, do not get caught up
in comparisons with role models or body types that may
seem to be macho or chic but in reality are not becoming
to you as sons and daughters of our loving Heavenly Father. One 17-year-old girl became so obsessed about her
figure that she began to skip meals and ended up with an
eating disorder. When it became apparent to her father,
he insisted that she eat a substantial meal. This confrontation eventually brought her to her senses. (p. 4)

Also, an article in the New Era, which is a monthly publication dedicated to adolescent members of the church, focused specifically on eating disorder risk (Maynes, 2006).
The author highlighted warning signs and listed helpful
resources. Letters to the editors of LDS church magazines openly reference eating disorders and acknowledge
the salutary influence of some articles and talks. For example, in the October 2005 Ensign (which is a monthly
publication for adult members), a reader wrote:
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risk for eating disorders would have scores that were lower than expected. One reason may be that Student Life
prevention efforts are effective. Women’s Services and
Resources (WSR) sponsors eating-disorders prevention
programming throughout the school year that addresses
eating and body image problems. All of this programming is under the umbrella of WSR’s yearlong Recapturing Beauty campaign. The campaign includes:

portion sizes, create variety in their meals, and plan
healthy meals, and snacks.
• Lecture Series. Occasionally WSR hosts speakers
who have overcome eating disorders and are willing
to speak about their journey and what approaches
helped them. Speakers address theology regarding
the doctrine of the body, the role of our physical
bodies in our salvation, and the sacred stewardship
of the body. These lectures help students to have a
reverence and healthy respect for the body.

• The 10-Day Body Image Challenge. Held at the
beginning of each school year, this program focuses
on body image. The challenge includes one exercise
each day that encourages students to address the
way they view themselves and helps them develop
a greater love and appreciation for who they are as
divine beings. The exercises shift focus away from
the messages of the world to define beauty from an
internal standard.
• A Week of Mindful Eating. The purpose of this
activity is to educate students about the dangers of
dieting and teach them about intuitive eating, an approach that focuses on being attuned to their bodies
and learning to recognize hunger and satiety signals
rather than being dictated by an external authority
regarding how to eat.
• National Eating Disorders Awareness Week. This
event includes a variety of activities to educate students about eating disorders, including how to recognize the signs and symptoms of eating disorders
and how to help themselves or a loved one who is
dealing with an eating disorder. Activities include an
array of lectures about body image and the media,
media literacy, perfectionism, and self-esteem.
• Fed Up with Food. “Fed Up” is a weekly support
group for students who want to have a healthy view
of themselves and a healthy approach to eating.
Weekly discussions provide participants with skills
to challenge thinking and attitudes that lead to problematic eating and to empower them to be true to
themselves.
• Confidential Consultations. Confidential consultations are available for students struggling with
depression, anxiety, body image issues, or eating
problems. Consultants assess needs and provide information, making referrals to the counseling center
as needed.
• Nutrition Consolations. Nutrition consultations
help students determine healthy eating patterns, and

WSR’s activities are ongoing throughout the school year
and can be reviewed at recapturingbeauty.byu.edu.
Another reason for lower-than-expected eating disorder risk might be BYU’s unique social structure. One of
the ecological factors associated with eating disorder risk
for college-age women is the removal of intimate family
and social support. Leaving home and entering a competitive academic environment without social support can
elicit the onset or exacerbation of eating disorder symptoms (Vohs, Heatherton, & Herrin, 2001). The BYU
experience may be atypical in this regard. All students
are assigned to a geographically based ward (church
congregation). Within the ward system, students have
extensive social support in the form of bishops (pastors), home teachers (males assigned to visit and support specific ward members on a monthly basis), visiting
teachers (females assigned to visit and support specific
female ward members on a monthly basis), home evening
groups (small groups of males and females that meet every Monday evening for activities and shared worship),
weekly congregational worship services, and ward-wide
service and recreational activities on a monthly basis. All
students receive and provide social support for each other through the ward system. The enhanced opportunity
to have satisfying social and interpersonal relationships
may be a protective factor against eating disorder risk.
Another reason for lower-than-expected eating disorder risk might be the predominant doctrine taught in
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS).
In LDS doctrine, the physical body is considered essential for eternal progress and is to be treated with care and
reverence. The concept that the body is sacred and is a receptacle of divine presence is clearly taught. For example,
tattoos are eschewed and considered analogous to writing graffiti on a temple building. Body piercings are to be
avoided. It is not inconceivable that the same logic that
prompts individuals to revere and protect their physi34
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cal bodies would be a protective factor against many of
the outward symptoms of eating disorders. Binging and
purging, laxative abuse, or severe dietary restrictions may
be seen as harmful to the sacred body. Carroll and Spangler (2001) opined that the doctrine of the sacredness
of the body might be more salient for men than women. They also proposed that while the doctrine may be
equally salient for men and women, it could be compromised more for women because of the power of the thin
ideal in the media. Nevertheless, samples show that BYU
females are faring better than non-BYU females, and it
may be due to religious doctrine. There is also very specific scripture within the LDS belief system, called the
Word of Wisdom, that provides both proscriptions and
prescriptions regarding substances that should be avoided and food that should be eaten to enhance spiritual and
physical health. Of course, doctrine can be distorted in
the thoughts of a student suffering from eating disorder
symptoms and ironically used as a rationalization that
perpetuates unhealthy behavior. However, the young
women on BYU campus may be benefitting from the
predominant doctrinal messages within the LDS church.
Another related factor might be addresses by ecclesiastical leaders and publications of the LDS church that
have moved beyond the general doctrine of reverence for
the body to specifically referencing eating disorders. For
example, in the 2001 article “Who Do You Think You
Are?—A Message to Youth,” James E. Faust of the First
Presidency of the LDS church advised:

Thank you for your July 2005 article “The Body, a Sacred
Gift.” For more than seven years an eating disorder has
been the lens through which I see my body. My battle to
turn to the Lord and the healing power of the Atonement
was considerably aided by your article and its timing. I
appreciate your constant sensitivity to today’s problems
and your courage in addressing them. (p. 79)

Another reader wrote in the September 2006 Ensign:
I want to thank you for the article “My Battle with Anorexia.” I had kept my eating disorder secret for a long
time and this article helped me realize that what I was
doing did not coincide with the gospel and hurt me spiritually, though I would have never admitted it. (p. 48)

Any one or a combination of such unique factors in the
BYU ecology may be influencing the diminished risk of
eating disorders on campus. Although it is clear that the
thin-ideal message promulgated by the popular media is
having the same impact on body dissatisfaction of BYU
females as measured by the BSQ, the risk rates of their
self-reported eating disorder symptoms as measured
by the EAT are less than those estimated on other college campuses. Although one or a combination of such
unique factors in the BYU ecology are not completely
effective, as BYU still has a 9% to 10% overall risk and
some subgroups are at higher risk, something in the ecology seems to be blunting the expected risk.
We have speculated about the surprising findings in
this study. Perhaps the most effective design that can explore what ecological factors might be at play will be a
qualitative study utilizing in-depth interviews of BYU
women at the various stages of their academic careers.
There may be developmental processes as well as ecological influences that are only accessible through qualitative
inquiry. Qualitative design can be used for confirmatory
purposes and is not limited to exploration only. Such a
study is strongly recommended.

In your quest to define yourselves, do not get caught up
in comparisons with role models or body types that may
seem to be macho or chic but in reality are not becoming
to you as sons and daughters of our loving Heavenly Father. One 17-year-old girl became so obsessed about her
figure that she began to skip meals and ended up with an
eating disorder. When it became apparent to her father,
he insisted that she eat a substantial meal. This confrontation eventually brought her to her senses. (p. 4)

Also, an article in the New Era, which is a monthly publication dedicated to adolescent members of the church, focused specifically on eating disorder risk (Maynes, 2006).
The author highlighted warning signs and listed helpful
resources. Letters to the editors of LDS church magazines openly reference eating disorders and acknowledge
the salutary influence of some articles and talks. For example, in the October 2005 Ensign (which is a monthly
publication for adult members), a reader wrote:
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Baptized in Acid or Breathed with Life? An Exploration of
Psychology’s Bridging Capacity
Michael J. Richardson
Three influences are described as contributing to a changing understanding of “secular” that ultimately excluded a consideration of theistic considerations: First, the separation of religious and scientific domains following Cartesian dualism opened the
door for the popularization of a naturalistic science with a central characteristic of being independent of theistic considerations.
Dualism eventually emphasized a distinction between subjective and objective experiences, rather than a distinction between
spiritual and material realities—allowing the possibility of a purely naturalistic dualism. Second, naturalistic science made
inroads back into traditionally religious questions involving the “objective” realm, particularly through the work of Charles
Darwin. Third, drawing on assumptions from naturalistic science, psychology made inroads into the “subjective” realm, which
helped popularize naturalistic science and marginalize theistic religion by substituting naturalistic explanations for religious
explanations of mental, spiritual, and physical experiences. Implications regarding potential opportunities and obligations for
responding to this trend are explored for religious psychologists.

A

of change, shouldn’t we be as interested in what might be
as in what has been?
In order to understand the possibilities of the future,
we would do well to take a deeper look at the past. In the
present paper, I explore the influence of psychology on
the secularization of society—its influence on removing
consideration of God from our professional change processes (such as psychotherapy and education)—thereby
creating a chasm between religious and professional
practices involving change. I also argue, however, that
this secularizing influence of psychology and other social
sciences reveals a bridging capacity and that by under-

pplied social and behavioral sciences, such as psychology and education, of necessity reach beyond
descriptions of what is and aspire to facilitate healthy
change. Practitioners of the social and behavioral sciences who believe in an active and involved God, without
whom we cannot work as effectively as we might wish,
are often frustrated by the “God-free” assumptions that
underlie their respective disciplines. Many are committed to bridging the chasm between the assumptions and
practices that seem inherent in their profession and their
personal religious and spiritual beliefs and practices.
Indeed this chasm exists, and to the extent that the assumptions underlying our disciplines and those underlying our religious and spiritual practices are incompatible,
the chasm may be impossible to bridge (Richardson &
Slife, 2013; Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010). However,
to the extent that believing practitioners continue to be
both believers and practitioners, we seem to hold out
hope that things might be otherwise. After all, as agents
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standing that bridging capacity we might make better use
of it in the future.

Modern definitions of secularism are quite different
from this original secularism in that they emphasize an
independence from or even opposition to religious perspectives while often maintaining that secularism is neutral toward religion (Slife & Reber, 2009). For example,
Dictionary.com defines secularism as “1. secular spirit or
tendency, esp. a system of political or social philosophy
that rejects all forms of religious faith and worship” and
“2. the view that public education and other matters of
civil policy should be conducted without the introduction of a religious element” (Secularism, n.d.-a). Merriam-Webster Online similarly defines secularism as
“indifference to or rejection or exclusion of religion and
religious considerations” (Secularism, n.d.-b). According
to these definitions, modern secularism no longer implies a freedom of dialogue between different points of
view, whether religious or not. Rather, modern secularism by such definitions implies the exclusion of religious
thought and the favoritism of nonreligious thought.
Several historical developments were involved in reshaping our modern understanding of secularism and
the movement toward exclusion of religious ideas from
the public sphere. For the purposes of examining the role
psychology played in this process, I will describe three
of these historical developments: (a) the separation of
religion and natural science, reflected in a mind-body dualism; (b) natural science inroads into traditionally religious questions about the “objective” world, including the
question of our physical nature; and (c) inroads from the
social sciences, driven in important ways by the influence
of psychology, into the “subjective” world, including the
nature of consciousness or mind.

Reformation, Pluralism, and Original Secularism

Several authors trace the roots of secular society to the
Reformation and the resulting religious plurality and
conflict (Nord, 1995; Pannenberg, 1996; Taylor, 2007).
Religious differences eventually undermined the establishment of a particular religion as a foundation for
society in general (Pannenberg, 1996). Charles Taylor
(2007) has argued that part of the effect of the Reformation was that a broad middle ground ultimately opened
up between theistic and nontheistic worldviews, allowing
people to explore a wider range and variety of belief or
disbelief. Freed from a particular dogma, the individual,
as well as broader society, was then able to explore both
religious and nonreligious points of view in a pluralistic
setting. In addition to reforming religion and society, this
pluralistic setting also opened the possibility for the restoration of older beliefs and practices that had been suppressed during a time of monolithic religious dominance.
However, it was in this context of religious plurality
and dissent that the possibility of a secular society based
on the value of free thought also arose ( Jacoby, 2004).
If a shared belief in religious faith could not unify society, then perhaps a shared belief in reason and critical
thinking could. This sort of “original secularism” (Reber,
2006, p. 194) was not intended to exclude religious influence but rather to avoid unexamined constraints against
free thought. Still, it replaced the unifying value of seeking to understand God’s will with the unifying value of
reason—or of experience, or both—and the unfettered
exploration of ideas.
Many early free thinkers were devout religious believers who were united not by opposition to religion but
by opposition to any sort of oppression or uncritical acceptance of dogmatic assumptions (Pannenberg, 1996;
Reber, 2006). Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that most of
these early free thinkers “would have been scandalized
by the thought that they were depriving Christian truth
claims and morality of public influence” (sec. III, para.
5) and calls this early approach to free thought a “classical alliance” (sec. VI, para. 4) between faith and reason.
Similarly, Huston Smith (2001) argues that science and
religion were “allies” at this time in history (p. 80).

Separation of Religion and Natural Science

As noted, original secularism or free thought included
a dialogue between religious and nonreligious points
of view, and the exclusion of religious perspectives in
particular would have been unthinkable (Pannenberg,
1996). In order for secularism to take on the connotations of rejection and exclusion of—or even simply independence from—religion suggested by the modern
definitions, an initial separation between the “religious”
and “nonreligious” would have to occur. This distinction
arose from the separation of religion from natural science
and has been traced to an ontological separation of mind
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(or spirit) from body (or the physical world) associated
with Cartesian dualism (Griffin, 2000).
David Ray Griffin (2000) argues that Cartesian dualism initially allowed for an assumption that theistic
considerations were independent from inquiry into the
natural or material world. In one sense, this dualism was
thought to protect a belief in God from scientific challenges to belief—which was perhaps Descartes’ intent—
but this hope was ultimately not realized. Another result
of dualism was the converse assumption that the natural
world could be studied without reference to divine influences.
This assumption became foundational for a mechanistic, materialistic, or “naturalistic” worldview that came
to dominate scientific inquiry (Griffin, 2000). Whereas
early dualists subordinated mechanistic nature to spiritual and divine forces, later dualists ultimately eliminated
reference to these “supernatural” forces and focused exclusively on a “natural” world (Griffin, 2000, p. 28), which
was assumed to be composed solely of “disenchanted”
(Taylor, 2007, p. 773) matter and mechanistic processes
devoid of spiritual or divine influence.
Furthermore, what had been associated with divine
or spiritual influence by early dualists was later ascribed
solely to mental, or subjective, experience—as simply
“epiphenomena” of objective material realities (Griffin,
2000). This latter sort of dualism entailed both a subjectobject split (Bishop, 2007)—rather than a spirit-matter
split—and a reversal of the relationship between mind
and body. Rather than subjecting matter to the influence of spirit/mind, an epiphenomenal mind was now
subjected to the mechanistic processes of the material
world. This version of dualism was described by Taylor
(2007) as a “modern ontic dualism: Mind over against a
mechanistic, meaning-shorn universe, without internal
purposes such as the older universe had” (p. 773).
This new vision of science, described as “scientific naturalism” (Griffin, 2000, p. 11), can be distinguished from
the earlier view of science in which religion and science
were seen as allies (Smith, 2001). As scientific naturalism
became a dominant force in society, some held out hope
that naturalistic science might provide a “common faith”
in an increasingly relativistic milieu of moralities—or
instead of oppressive religious dogmas of the past. One
notable thinker who explicitly argued this point, John
Dewey (1934), has had a particularly important influence in both psychology and education. In this sense, the

absence of universal religious grounding allowed for the
laws described by natural science as universal—including naturalistic theories regarding human nature and
development—to become a possible foundation for a
“secular” social order ( Johnson, 1995; Nord, 1995; Pannenberg, 1996).
Natural-Science Inroads into the “Objective”

Taylor (2007) describes the way we collectively view
ourselves as a society as the “social imaginary.” According
to Taylor, in order for an idea to be translated into common practice it must “infiltrate the social imaginary” (p.
172) or become part of a common understanding in society. Thus, in order for naturalistic science to become the
common ground for a secular social order (and thus alter
the meaning of “secular”), the ideas and assumptions of
natural science would need to spread to the social imaginary.
Natural science—which following dualism had been
considered independent of, or even neutral toward, religion—initially confined itself to inquiries about what
was considered the material or “objective” world (e.g.,
physics, chemistry, and astronomy), leaving the spiritual
or “subjective” world to religion. Although conflict had
once erupted over descriptions of a material world and
universe that differed from religious authority, religious
pluralism along with Cartesian dualism may have allowed for such inquiry to be less threatening to believers.
However, a notable exception occurred when natural science tackled the question of biological development. The
advent of Darwinian evolution, in the minds of some,
provided a naturalistic alternative explanation for such
“objective” phenomena as the diversity of species and
the origins of humankind (Brickhouse & Letts, 1998;
Griffin, 2000; Johnson, 1998). However, separating God
from this aspect of the material world seemed particularly
offensive to believers, perhaps because Darwinian evolution appeared to contradict scriptural accounts of the
creation of man and animals, which were widely shared
by religious adherents in spite of religious pluralism.
Accordingly, Griffin (2000) calls Darwinian naturalism “the very heart of the conflict between science and
theistic religious belief since the time of Charles Darwin”
(p. 20). In addition to seeming to contradict scripture,
Darwinian naturalism potentially altered the traditionally accepted relationship between mind and body as well
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civil policy should be conducted without the introduction of a religious element” (Secularism, n.d.-a). Merriam-Webster Online similarly defines secularism as
“indifference to or rejection or exclusion of religion and
religious considerations” (Secularism, n.d.-b). According
to these definitions, modern secularism no longer implies a freedom of dialogue between different points of
view, whether religious or not. Rather, modern secularism by such definitions implies the exclusion of religious
thought and the favoritism of nonreligious thought.
Several historical developments were involved in reshaping our modern understanding of secularism and
the movement toward exclusion of religious ideas from
the public sphere. For the purposes of examining the role
psychology played in this process, I will describe three
of these historical developments: (a) the separation of
religion and natural science, reflected in a mind-body dualism; (b) natural science inroads into traditionally religious questions about the “objective” world, including the
question of our physical nature; and (c) inroads from the
social sciences, driven in important ways by the influence
of psychology, into the “subjective” world, including the
nature of consciousness or mind.

Reformation, Pluralism, and Original Secularism

Several authors trace the roots of secular society to the
Reformation and the resulting religious plurality and
conflict (Nord, 1995; Pannenberg, 1996; Taylor, 2007).
Religious differences eventually undermined the establishment of a particular religion as a foundation for
society in general (Pannenberg, 1996). Charles Taylor
(2007) has argued that part of the effect of the Reformation was that a broad middle ground ultimately opened
up between theistic and nontheistic worldviews, allowing
people to explore a wider range and variety of belief or
disbelief. Freed from a particular dogma, the individual,
as well as broader society, was then able to explore both
religious and nonreligious points of view in a pluralistic
setting. In addition to reforming religion and society, this
pluralistic setting also opened the possibility for the restoration of older beliefs and practices that had been suppressed during a time of monolithic religious dominance.
However, it was in this context of religious plurality
and dissent that the possibility of a secular society based
on the value of free thought also arose ( Jacoby, 2004).
If a shared belief in religious faith could not unify society, then perhaps a shared belief in reason and critical
thinking could. This sort of “original secularism” (Reber,
2006, p. 194) was not intended to exclude religious influence but rather to avoid unexamined constraints against
free thought. Still, it replaced the unifying value of seeking to understand God’s will with the unifying value of
reason—or of experience, or both—and the unfettered
exploration of ideas.
Many early free thinkers were devout religious believers who were united not by opposition to religion but
by opposition to any sort of oppression or uncritical acceptance of dogmatic assumptions (Pannenberg, 1996;
Reber, 2006). Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that most of
these early free thinkers “would have been scandalized
by the thought that they were depriving Christian truth
claims and morality of public influence” (sec. III, para.
5) and calls this early approach to free thought a “classical alliance” (sec. VI, para. 4) between faith and reason.
Similarly, Huston Smith (2001) argues that science and
religion were “allies” at this time in history (p. 80).

Separation of Religion and Natural Science

As noted, original secularism or free thought included
a dialogue between religious and nonreligious points
of view, and the exclusion of religious perspectives in
particular would have been unthinkable (Pannenberg,
1996). In order for secularism to take on the connotations of rejection and exclusion of—or even simply independence from—religion suggested by the modern
definitions, an initial separation between the “religious”
and “nonreligious” would have to occur. This distinction
arose from the separation of religion from natural science
and has been traced to an ontological separation of mind
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David Ray Griffin (2000) argues that Cartesian dualism initially allowed for an assumption that theistic
considerations were independent from inquiry into the
natural or material world. In one sense, this dualism was
thought to protect a belief in God from scientific challenges to belief—which was perhaps Descartes’ intent—
but this hope was ultimately not realized. Another result
of dualism was the converse assumption that the natural
world could be studied without reference to divine influences.
This assumption became foundational for a mechanistic, materialistic, or “naturalistic” worldview that came
to dominate scientific inquiry (Griffin, 2000). Whereas
early dualists subordinated mechanistic nature to spiritual and divine forces, later dualists ultimately eliminated
reference to these “supernatural” forces and focused exclusively on a “natural” world (Griffin, 2000, p. 28), which
was assumed to be composed solely of “disenchanted”
(Taylor, 2007, p. 773) matter and mechanistic processes
devoid of spiritual or divine influence.
Furthermore, what had been associated with divine
or spiritual influence by early dualists was later ascribed
solely to mental, or subjective, experience—as simply
“epiphenomena” of objective material realities (Griffin,
2000). This latter sort of dualism entailed both a subjectobject split (Bishop, 2007)—rather than a spirit-matter
split—and a reversal of the relationship between mind
and body. Rather than subjecting matter to the influence of spirit/mind, an epiphenomenal mind was now
subjected to the mechanistic processes of the material
world. This version of dualism was described by Taylor
(2007) as a “modern ontic dualism: Mind over against a
mechanistic, meaning-shorn universe, without internal
purposes such as the older universe had” (p. 773).
This new vision of science, described as “scientific naturalism” (Griffin, 2000, p. 11), can be distinguished from
the earlier view of science in which religion and science
were seen as allies (Smith, 2001). As scientific naturalism
became a dominant force in society, some held out hope
that naturalistic science might provide a “common faith”
in an increasingly relativistic milieu of moralities—or
instead of oppressive religious dogmas of the past. One
notable thinker who explicitly argued this point, John
Dewey (1934), has had a particularly important influence in both psychology and education. In this sense, the

absence of universal religious grounding allowed for the
laws described by natural science as universal—including naturalistic theories regarding human nature and
development—to become a possible foundation for a
“secular” social order ( Johnson, 1995; Nord, 1995; Pannenberg, 1996).
Natural-Science Inroads into the “Objective”

Taylor (2007) describes the way we collectively view
ourselves as a society as the “social imaginary.” According
to Taylor, in order for an idea to be translated into common practice it must “infiltrate the social imaginary” (p.
172) or become part of a common understanding in society. Thus, in order for naturalistic science to become the
common ground for a secular social order (and thus alter
the meaning of “secular”), the ideas and assumptions of
natural science would need to spread to the social imaginary.
Natural science—which following dualism had been
considered independent of, or even neutral toward, religion—initially confined itself to inquiries about what
was considered the material or “objective” world (e.g.,
physics, chemistry, and astronomy), leaving the spiritual
or “subjective” world to religion. Although conflict had
once erupted over descriptions of a material world and
universe that differed from religious authority, religious
pluralism along with Cartesian dualism may have allowed for such inquiry to be less threatening to believers.
However, a notable exception occurred when natural science tackled the question of biological development. The
advent of Darwinian evolution, in the minds of some,
provided a naturalistic alternative explanation for such
“objective” phenomena as the diversity of species and
the origins of humankind (Brickhouse & Letts, 1998;
Griffin, 2000; Johnson, 1998). However, separating God
from this aspect of the material world seemed particularly
offensive to believers, perhaps because Darwinian evolution appeared to contradict scriptural accounts of the
creation of man and animals, which were widely shared
by religious adherents in spite of religious pluralism.
Accordingly, Griffin (2000) calls Darwinian naturalism “the very heart of the conflict between science and
theistic religious belief since the time of Charles Darwin”
(p. 20). In addition to seeming to contradict scripture,
Darwinian naturalism potentially altered the traditionally accepted relationship between mind and body as well
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as between God and the material world. That is, whereas
the material world (including the body) had once been
thought of as subject to influence from the mind (or
spirit) and God, Darwinian evolution seemed to reject
this possibility in favor of naturalistic explanations for
physiological processes. According to Griffin,

religion would be invaded and perhaps the primary reason for its existence undermined.
Psychology, in this sense, frequently addresses phenomena traditionally left to religionists (Williams,
2001), such as mental, spiritual, and moral experience,
but largely confines itself to strictly naturalistic assumptions and explanations regarding these phenomena (Slife
& Whoolery, 2006). For example, in research about how
people think about God, references to divine influence
as a possible cause for such thoughts are avoided, whereas the idea that beliefs about God are simply effects of
naturalistic processes dominates the field (Slife & Reber,
2009).
From one perspective, such movements into the “subjective” might be seen as a natural result of the failure of
dualism to resolve the philosophical problem of how two
separate realities (i.e., “subjective” and “objective” realities)
could interact (Griffin, 2000). Thus, inquiry about the
physical body would naturally lead to inquiry about the
mind. However, others suggest that these social science
renderings of experience may have been more purposive
as attempts to displace religion as a basis for social order,
at least in some cases. According to Warren Nord (1995),

the idea that all the behavior of matter is governed by laws
of nature, combined with the recognition that the human
body is comprised of the same material elements as everything else, led to the conclusion that all bodily activities
must be as law-governed as the events in the laboratory
or the interactions of billiard balls. (p. 29)

That is, laws of nature, rather than spiritual or divine
influences, were now thought to be the source of physiological activity. Griffin cites Darwin as arguing that
“allowing mind to introduce ‘caprice’ into the world . . .
would make science impossible” (p. 29). According to
Griffin, Darwin also “rejected the idea of any divine intervention to explain the origin of the human mind” (p. 34).
Thus, under Darwinian naturalism, mind, spirit, or even
God could no longer be thought of as having supremacy
over biological activity.
Natural-Science Inroads into the “Subjective”

the great scientists of nature were not, for the most part,
avowed opponents of religion, but many of the great social scientists were. One important reason is that the social sciences were, in the beginning, morally and politically motivated: early social scientists were social critics who
saw organized religion propping up reactionary regimes,
inhibiting free inquiry and social progress. Of course, social science also inherited the tension all scientific method
had with religion. As a result, many of the great social
scientists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
took it as a special responsibility to discredit religion by
arguing . . . that it had naturalistic causes. (p. 28)

In spite of the central role Darwinian naturalism
played in the conflict between science and religion (Griffin, 2000), Darwinian thought was initially insufficient to
displace religious perspectives in the social imaginary. In
spite of Darwin’s apparent hopes that his theory would
not require appeals to divine activity (Griffin), evolutionary theory itself was frequently altered or subsumed by
religious thinkers as simply God’s method of creation
(Eyring, 1983; Johnson, 1998). Thus, a second type of
movement of natural science into traditionally religious
questions must be considered in order to account for a
popularization of naturalism sufficient to displace the
dominant role religion continued to play in society.
This second movement involved social science inquiry
into “subjective” experiences. Psychology in particular
played an important role in further popularizing naturalistic science through inquiry into such experiences,
including many considered central to religious thought
(Meador, 2003). What Darwin’s theory lacked, psychology and the social sciences began to increasingly offer. If
important matters of the mind, heart, and spirit could be
explained naturalistically, the final stronghold of theistic

Nord suggests here that inroads of the social sciences
into religious questions may have been a deliberate attempt to “discredit religion” in order to undermine and
perhaps replace the dominance of religion in society—a
dominance that was considered by some to be oppressive. Thus, although inroads into the “objective” may have
simply been a result of the failures of dualism, inroads
into the “subjective” realm may have been more deliberate.
Psychology, for example, with the apparent weight of
empirical authority and therapeutic practices that promised to alleviate such (formerly spiritual) ills as sadness
and guilt, seemed to represent an improvement over
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strictly religious approaches (Meador, 2003). With this
hope, psychological explanation and therapeutic practice
rapidly proliferated throughout the twentieth century,
even being welcomed and promoted by influential religious leaders as offering solutions they no longer found
in their theology (Kugelmann, 2005; Meador, 2003).
Whereas Darwin opened the door for theorizing about
the naturalistic evolution of religious and moral thought,
Freud (1930/1961) did some of the initial work of explaining how such thought might emerge from inborn
naturalistic tendencies, such as unconscious drives and
pressures from the natural world.
Theistic religion might have resisted such thinkers as
Freud and Darwin, but the rapid proliferation of alternative psychological theories may have overcome many
objections. For those who questioned the scientific
grounding of Freud’s theory, behaviorism emerged with
its empirical demonstrations. For those who disliked the
arguably dim view of humanity posed by both psychodynamic and behavioral thought, humanistic psychology
emerged with its focus on a naturalistic human tendency
toward self-actualization—giving practitioners and consumers of psychology many choices of theoretical approaches but none that took God’s influence seriously.
B. F. Skinner (1953) advocated the view that all experience, including religious experience, could be explained
naturalistically and without a consideration of the possible action of God. For Skinner,“traditional descriptions
of Heaven and Hell epitomize positive and negative reinforcement” (pp. 352–353). In Walden Two, Skinner
pressed further into religious terrain when his protagonist identified with Jesus, not as a God but as a great psychologist and honored colleague (Woefel, 1977). Jesus’s
love was recast as positive reinforcement and Jesus was
praised for favoring this behavioristic principle over less
effective punishment.The protagonist is described as
god-like in acting as both creator and redeemer of a better society and also as one who had come further even
than Jesus in his understanding of reinforcement principles and their applications (Woefel, 1977).
Humanistic psychology might have played a particularly influential role in making inroads from psychology
to religion. Mike Arons (1976) argues that humanistic
psychology was well situated to transform both psychological science and religion. Humanistic psychology was
seen as restoring such considerations as value, meaning,
consciousness, and subjectivity to a psychological science

that had become primarily concerned with the objective
and empirical. Conversely, humanistic psychology was
seen as potentially broadening Western religious views
of salvation, in part through the influence of Eastern philosophies on humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychology supposedly offered Western religion a freedom
from its former “irrationality,” “blind faith,” “servility,” and
“acquiescence to authority” (Arons, para. 4).
In addition to these reformulations of mental experience offered through psychological inquiry, psychotherapeutic practice soon offered religionists a new sort of
ministry, promising empirically tested relief from psychological, emotional, and perhaps even spiritual suffering. Lifelong human struggles formerly associated with
such theistic themes as pride and humility, sin and selfsacrifice, repentance and redemption were now able to be
relieved in perhaps a few short sessions with a psychotherapist, and at a quantifiable cost. The rapid adoption
of psychological solutions to ministerial concerns in both
Protestant (Meador, 2003) and Catholic (Kugelmann,
2005) circles has been documented.
For example, Keith Meador (2003) argues, “It is no
longer uncommon to interpret Christianity as a vague
set of therapeutic practices dedicated to personal health
and well being” (p. 269). Meador goes on to describe his
analysis of what he calls the “most influential American
Protestant journal” of the early twentieth century, the
Christian Century. Meador argues that during the time
Charles Clayton Morrison was editor and writer for the
magazine, articles referring to psychology and the use of
psychological language increased. Meador supplies several telling quotes from Morrison, supporting the idea
that the influence of psychology on Protestant thinking
was increasing during this time—at least as represented
by the Christian Century. In a 1910 editorial, called “From
Laboratory to Pulpit,” the Christian Century editors wrote:
It has long been our conviction that the most important
testimony to the truth of religion and the reality of a spiritual world is yet to come, not from theologians, but from
psychologists. The day of dogma is past. The scientific
method of study and proof sweeps the field. . . . A new
type of proof is forthcoming—the professors call it a new
apologetic—which grounds itself in the bed-rock of experience and follows the most rigid method known to any
science and comes out, fairly and without stumbling, on
the side of faith. The psychologists are the apostles of this
new gospel. (as cited in Meador, p. 281)
41

volume 35

issues in religion and psychotherapy

as between God and the material world. That is, whereas
the material world (including the body) had once been
thought of as subject to influence from the mind (or
spirit) and God, Darwinian evolution seemed to reject
this possibility in favor of naturalistic explanations for
physiological processes. According to Griffin,

religion would be invaded and perhaps the primary reason for its existence undermined.
Psychology, in this sense, frequently addresses phenomena traditionally left to religionists (Williams,
2001), such as mental, spiritual, and moral experience,
but largely confines itself to strictly naturalistic assumptions and explanations regarding these phenomena (Slife
& Whoolery, 2006). For example, in research about how
people think about God, references to divine influence
as a possible cause for such thoughts are avoided, whereas the idea that beliefs about God are simply effects of
naturalistic processes dominates the field (Slife & Reber,
2009).
From one perspective, such movements into the “subjective” might be seen as a natural result of the failure of
dualism to resolve the philosophical problem of how two
separate realities (i.e., “subjective” and “objective” realities)
could interact (Griffin, 2000). Thus, inquiry about the
physical body would naturally lead to inquiry about the
mind. However, others suggest that these social science
renderings of experience may have been more purposive
as attempts to displace religion as a basis for social order,
at least in some cases. According to Warren Nord (1995),

the idea that all the behavior of matter is governed by laws
of nature, combined with the recognition that the human
body is comprised of the same material elements as everything else, led to the conclusion that all bodily activities
must be as law-governed as the events in the laboratory
or the interactions of billiard balls. (p. 29)
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would make science impossible” (p. 29). According to
Griffin, Darwin also “rejected the idea of any divine intervention to explain the origin of the human mind” (p. 34).
Thus, under Darwinian naturalism, mind, spirit, or even
God could no longer be thought of as having supremacy
over biological activity.
Natural-Science Inroads into the “Subjective”

the great scientists of nature were not, for the most part,
avowed opponents of religion, but many of the great social scientists were. One important reason is that the social sciences were, in the beginning, morally and politically motivated: early social scientists were social critics who
saw organized religion propping up reactionary regimes,
inhibiting free inquiry and social progress. Of course, social science also inherited the tension all scientific method
had with religion. As a result, many of the great social
scientists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
took it as a special responsibility to discredit religion by
arguing . . . that it had naturalistic causes. (p. 28)

In spite of the central role Darwinian naturalism
played in the conflict between science and religion (Griffin, 2000), Darwinian thought was initially insufficient to
displace religious perspectives in the social imaginary. In
spite of Darwin’s apparent hopes that his theory would
not require appeals to divine activity (Griffin), evolutionary theory itself was frequently altered or subsumed by
religious thinkers as simply God’s method of creation
(Eyring, 1983; Johnson, 1998). Thus, a second type of
movement of natural science into traditionally religious
questions must be considered in order to account for a
popularization of naturalism sufficient to displace the
dominant role religion continued to play in society.
This second movement involved social science inquiry
into “subjective” experiences. Psychology in particular
played an important role in further popularizing naturalistic science through inquiry into such experiences,
including many considered central to religious thought
(Meador, 2003). What Darwin’s theory lacked, psychology and the social sciences began to increasingly offer. If
important matters of the mind, heart, and spirit could be
explained naturalistically, the final stronghold of theistic

Nord suggests here that inroads of the social sciences
into religious questions may have been a deliberate attempt to “discredit religion” in order to undermine and
perhaps replace the dominance of religion in society—a
dominance that was considered by some to be oppressive. Thus, although inroads into the “objective” may have
simply been a result of the failures of dualism, inroads
into the “subjective” realm may have been more deliberate.
Psychology, for example, with the apparent weight of
empirical authority and therapeutic practices that promised to alleviate such (formerly spiritual) ills as sadness
and guilt, seemed to represent an improvement over
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strictly religious approaches (Meador, 2003). With this
hope, psychological explanation and therapeutic practice
rapidly proliferated throughout the twentieth century,
even being welcomed and promoted by influential religious leaders as offering solutions they no longer found
in their theology (Kugelmann, 2005; Meador, 2003).
Whereas Darwin opened the door for theorizing about
the naturalistic evolution of religious and moral thought,
Freud (1930/1961) did some of the initial work of explaining how such thought might emerge from inborn
naturalistic tendencies, such as unconscious drives and
pressures from the natural world.
Theistic religion might have resisted such thinkers as
Freud and Darwin, but the rapid proliferation of alternative psychological theories may have overcome many
objections. For those who questioned the scientific
grounding of Freud’s theory, behaviorism emerged with
its empirical demonstrations. For those who disliked the
arguably dim view of humanity posed by both psychodynamic and behavioral thought, humanistic psychology
emerged with its focus on a naturalistic human tendency
toward self-actualization—giving practitioners and consumers of psychology many choices of theoretical approaches but none that took God’s influence seriously.
B. F. Skinner (1953) advocated the view that all experience, including religious experience, could be explained
naturalistically and without a consideration of the possible action of God. For Skinner,“traditional descriptions
of Heaven and Hell epitomize positive and negative reinforcement” (pp. 352–353). In Walden Two, Skinner
pressed further into religious terrain when his protagonist identified with Jesus, not as a God but as a great psychologist and honored colleague (Woefel, 1977). Jesus’s
love was recast as positive reinforcement and Jesus was
praised for favoring this behavioristic principle over less
effective punishment.The protagonist is described as
god-like in acting as both creator and redeemer of a better society and also as one who had come further even
than Jesus in his understanding of reinforcement principles and their applications (Woefel, 1977).
Humanistic psychology might have played a particularly influential role in making inroads from psychology
to religion. Mike Arons (1976) argues that humanistic
psychology was well situated to transform both psychological science and religion. Humanistic psychology was
seen as restoring such considerations as value, meaning,
consciousness, and subjectivity to a psychological science

that had become primarily concerned with the objective
and empirical. Conversely, humanistic psychology was
seen as potentially broadening Western religious views
of salvation, in part through the influence of Eastern philosophies on humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychology supposedly offered Western religion a freedom
from its former “irrationality,” “blind faith,” “servility,” and
“acquiescence to authority” (Arons, para. 4).
In addition to these reformulations of mental experience offered through psychological inquiry, psychotherapeutic practice soon offered religionists a new sort of
ministry, promising empirically tested relief from psychological, emotional, and perhaps even spiritual suffering. Lifelong human struggles formerly associated with
such theistic themes as pride and humility, sin and selfsacrifice, repentance and redemption were now able to be
relieved in perhaps a few short sessions with a psychotherapist, and at a quantifiable cost. The rapid adoption
of psychological solutions to ministerial concerns in both
Protestant (Meador, 2003) and Catholic (Kugelmann,
2005) circles has been documented.
For example, Keith Meador (2003) argues, “It is no
longer uncommon to interpret Christianity as a vague
set of therapeutic practices dedicated to personal health
and well being” (p. 269). Meador goes on to describe his
analysis of what he calls the “most influential American
Protestant journal” of the early twentieth century, the
Christian Century. Meador argues that during the time
Charles Clayton Morrison was editor and writer for the
magazine, articles referring to psychology and the use of
psychological language increased. Meador supplies several telling quotes from Morrison, supporting the idea
that the influence of psychology on Protestant thinking
was increasing during this time—at least as represented
by the Christian Century. In a 1910 editorial, called “From
Laboratory to Pulpit,” the Christian Century editors wrote:
It has long been our conviction that the most important
testimony to the truth of religion and the reality of a spiritual world is yet to come, not from theologians, but from
psychologists. The day of dogma is past. The scientific
method of study and proof sweeps the field. . . . A new
type of proof is forthcoming—the professors call it a new
apologetic—which grounds itself in the bed-rock of experience and follows the most rigid method known to any
science and comes out, fairly and without stumbling, on
the side of faith. The psychologists are the apostles of this
new gospel. (as cited in Meador, p. 281)
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Morrison thus appears to argue that psychology could
make up for some of the failings of theologians and that
dogma could be replaced by psychological empiricism—
even as “a new apologetic” for faith.
A few decades later, however, Morrison had apparently
had second thoughts about borrowing a methodology
grounded in naturalism. Nevertheless, Morrison’s later
lament also represents a sort of testimonial to the extent of psychology’s influence on Christianity (Meador,
2003):

not always achieved, in LDS counseling contexts, and apparently this is a boundary the LDS church intends to
maintain (Gleave, 2012).
However, reminiscent of Arons’s (1976) hopes, Kugelmann (2005) suggests that humanistic psychology
played an important role in weakening the boundaries
between church and psychology for Catholics and that
these changes came from both directions. Humanistic
psychologists opened the door by considering the “higher
reaches of human nature” (p. 349) and broadening their
view of legitimate psychological science. Catholic theologians and philosophers largely “welcomed” this new
psychology as they began to question their own views of
both themselves and of the sciences (Kugelmann).
In spite of humanism’s softening of psychology’s hard
empiricist edge, it appears that, contrary to Arons’s
(1976) vision, psychology has largely represented a oneway bridge between naturalism and theism. Several religious researchers and practitioners of psychology, including LDS psychologists, have convincingly argued that
psychology remains firmly rooted in naturalistic assumptions that are in many ways incompatible with theism
(e.g., Gantt & Williams, 2008; Slife & Whoolery, 2006).
According to Kugelmann (2005) and Meador (2003),
however, the effect of psychology on some aspects of theistic religion has been profound. If the historical relationship between psychology and religion has indeed been
so imbalanced—with psychology having profound influences on religion, while religion has had only superficial
influences on psychology—then the firm boundaries that
the LDS church seems intent to maintain (Gleave, 2012)
are certainly understandable, and organizations such as
AMCAP, along with individual religious psychologists
and educators, face a serious professional if not spiritual
challenge.
One reason for this one-sided influence might be that,
according to Slife and Whoolery (2006), the often-unexamined assumptions of psychological science include
such ideals as objectivism and materialism. Objectivism assumes a subject-object split (Bishop, 2007), placing the object of psychological inquiry external to, and
fundamentally separate from, the observer. This “objectivity” supposedly allows for observations to be free of
“opinions, biases, values and feelings” (Slife & Whoolery,
2006, p. 222). This assumption may be problematic for
religious psychologists primarily because of the “valuefreeness” dimension. Whether doing research or therapy,

I had baptized the whole Christian tradition in the waters
of psychological empiricism, and was vaguely awakening
to the fact that, after this procedure, what I had left was
hardly more than a moralistic ghost of the distinctive
Christian reality. It was as if the baptismal waters of the
empirical stream had been mixed with some acid which
ate away the historical significance, the objectivity and the
particularity of the Christian revelation, and left me in
complete subjectivity to work out my own salvation in
terms of social service and an “integrated personality.” (as
cited in Meador, p. 269)

Thus, contrary to his earlier hope that psychology would
be a “new apologetic” for faith, Morrison now seemed to
think that his faith had not been supported by psychology but rather replaced. In this sense, his earlier reference
to a “new” gospel might have been more prescient than he
supposed.
Robert Kugelmann (2005) argues that the older conflict between Catholics and Protestants gave way (beginning in the 1960s) to a conflict between liberal and
conservative Christians, defined in part by a liberal adoption of psychological theory and practice and a conservative adherence to traditional approaches. He argues
that this shift was taking place as much within churches
as between them. Although Meador’s (2003) analysis
suggests that this shift came somewhat earlier within
Protestantism, Kugelmann claims that the boundaries between psychology and religion began to weaken
in Catholicism primarily after 1960. Prior to that time,
although psychology was granted autonomy within the
church in matters of “fact” and “treatment” as long as it
didn’t contradict doctrine, Kugelmann cites Pope Pius
XII as limiting psychology’s role in what were considered
more foundational matters. The church maintained the
final word on “spiritual and moral issues” (p. 348) and on
such important doctrines as the nature of the soul. This
seems not unlike the current balance often hoped for, if
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a psychologist is expected to remain “objective,” “valuefree,” or “value-neutral.” Thus psychologists, no matter
how religious, are expected to eliminate or “control for” a
valuing of God’s influence in their research and practice
(Slife & Whoolery). It has been argued that the valuing
of value-freeness or value-neutrality pervades modern
secular education as well ( Johnson, 1995). This may be
due in part to the pervasive influence on public education of such notable psychologists as John Dewey and
Edward Thorndike, who both grounded their otherwise
contrasting theories in naturalistic assumptions that ignored the possibility of divine influence (Richardson &
Slife, 2013).
Similar to objectivism, the related notion of materialism assumes that what matters in psychological research
and therapy is the tangible, material, measurable, and observable (Slife & Whoolery, 2006). An example of this
view might be found in an assumption that mental experience, including religious experience, can be fully explained by efficient causal chemical activity in the brain
(Slife & Williams, 1995). Outside of neuroscience, even
the humanistic aspirations of describing and promoting
“higher” human experience often rely on material, observable operationalizations. These operationalizations
give constructs such as love, hope, faith, and divine inspiration a sense of empirical weight as encapsulated descriptions of behavior and emotion.
Furthermore, although humanism may soften the
deterministic assumptions of earlier schools of psychological thought, it may fail to fully extract itself from determinism, thus denying the value of human agency so
central to many religious people and to LDS doctrine in
particular. Humanistic determinism is notably manifest
in the assumption that an inborn actualizing tendency
drives much of human behavior, needs, and even desires
(Slife & Williams, 1995). Humanistic psychology also
typically retains assumptions of individualism and instrumentalism (Bishop, 2007), which may conflict with
such religious values as self-sacrifice and altruism.
Thus the meaning of spiritual and religious experience, as understood by many theists, may be distorted
by psychology to the extent that psychology retains
these naturalistic assumptions. What psychology typically gives us, then, may be at best an impoverished view
of religious and spiritual experience and at worst a view
that is completely disconnected from or even hostile to
that experience. Religious experiences of the divine are

then transformed such that they become described in
fully humanistic and materialistic terms, while psychology remains firmly grounded in naturalistic assumptions
(Reber, 2006; Slife & Whoolery, 2006). Psychology may
then leave theistic religion with what Morrison calls
“hardly more than a moralistic ghost” (Meador, 2003, p.
269) while itself remaining relatively unaltered by the encounter. This lopsided encounter may be largely due to
a widespread embracing of psychology by religion and a
highly limited embracing of religion by psychology.
So although this psychological bridge between secular and religious questions, between the subjective and
objective, between mind and body, between spirit and
matter, might have provided an opportunity for mutual
influence and dialogue, according to some theorists, religious ideas have tended to be distorted, subsumed,
replaced, or ignored in favor of naturalistic ideas when
it comes to the relationship between psychology and
religion (Bishop, 2007; Reber, 2006; Slife & Whoolery,
2006). The chasm between natural science and religion
has widened, with psychology making incursions into
religious territory while staying grounded in the assumptions of the new secularism, represented by naturalistic
(God-free) science.
Implications for the Religious Psychologist

The word “psyche” refers to the soul or spirit. As a study
of the spirit, then, psychology should ideally be situated at
the confluence of mind, spirit and body. It makes sense
that historically psychology was a center point for materialistic inroads into matters of mind and spirit. Unfortunately, with the adoption of strictly materialistic assumptions associated with the natural sciences, psychologists
created inroads with no outlets and thus a stagnating science of the mind.
However, the history of psychology’s largely one-sided
influence on religion might provide clues for how religion might inform psychology and, through psychology,
perhaps other sciences. By taking the spirit or soul that
should be the center of our discipline seriously, religious
psychologists might breathe some life (Gen. 2:7) into psychology and other sciences, which have otherwise tended
to focus primarily on the temporal and material elements
of experience—instead of allowing their understanding
of truth to being baptized in the acid (Meador, 2003) of
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Morrison thus appears to argue that psychology could
make up for some of the failings of theologians and that
dogma could be replaced by psychological empiricism—
even as “a new apologetic” for faith.
A few decades later, however, Morrison had apparently
had second thoughts about borrowing a methodology
grounded in naturalism. Nevertheless, Morrison’s later
lament also represents a sort of testimonial to the extent of psychology’s influence on Christianity (Meador,
2003):

not always achieved, in LDS counseling contexts, and apparently this is a boundary the LDS church intends to
maintain (Gleave, 2012).
However, reminiscent of Arons’s (1976) hopes, Kugelmann (2005) suggests that humanistic psychology
played an important role in weakening the boundaries
between church and psychology for Catholics and that
these changes came from both directions. Humanistic
psychologists opened the door by considering the “higher
reaches of human nature” (p. 349) and broadening their
view of legitimate psychological science. Catholic theologians and philosophers largely “welcomed” this new
psychology as they began to question their own views of
both themselves and of the sciences (Kugelmann).
In spite of humanism’s softening of psychology’s hard
empiricist edge, it appears that, contrary to Arons’s
(1976) vision, psychology has largely represented a oneway bridge between naturalism and theism. Several religious researchers and practitioners of psychology, including LDS psychologists, have convincingly argued that
psychology remains firmly rooted in naturalistic assumptions that are in many ways incompatible with theism
(e.g., Gantt & Williams, 2008; Slife & Whoolery, 2006).
According to Kugelmann (2005) and Meador (2003),
however, the effect of psychology on some aspects of theistic religion has been profound. If the historical relationship between psychology and religion has indeed been
so imbalanced—with psychology having profound influences on religion, while religion has had only superficial
influences on psychology—then the firm boundaries that
the LDS church seems intent to maintain (Gleave, 2012)
are certainly understandable, and organizations such as
AMCAP, along with individual religious psychologists
and educators, face a serious professional if not spiritual
challenge.
One reason for this one-sided influence might be that,
according to Slife and Whoolery (2006), the often-unexamined assumptions of psychological science include
such ideals as objectivism and materialism. Objectivism assumes a subject-object split (Bishop, 2007), placing the object of psychological inquiry external to, and
fundamentally separate from, the observer. This “objectivity” supposedly allows for observations to be free of
“opinions, biases, values and feelings” (Slife & Whoolery,
2006, p. 222). This assumption may be problematic for
religious psychologists primarily because of the “valuefreeness” dimension. Whether doing research or therapy,

I had baptized the whole Christian tradition in the waters
of psychological empiricism, and was vaguely awakening
to the fact that, after this procedure, what I had left was
hardly more than a moralistic ghost of the distinctive
Christian reality. It was as if the baptismal waters of the
empirical stream had been mixed with some acid which
ate away the historical significance, the objectivity and the
particularity of the Christian revelation, and left me in
complete subjectivity to work out my own salvation in
terms of social service and an “integrated personality.” (as
cited in Meador, p. 269)

Thus, contrary to his earlier hope that psychology would
be a “new apologetic” for faith, Morrison now seemed to
think that his faith had not been supported by psychology but rather replaced. In this sense, his earlier reference
to a “new” gospel might have been more prescient than he
supposed.
Robert Kugelmann (2005) argues that the older conflict between Catholics and Protestants gave way (beginning in the 1960s) to a conflict between liberal and
conservative Christians, defined in part by a liberal adoption of psychological theory and practice and a conservative adherence to traditional approaches. He argues
that this shift was taking place as much within churches
as between them. Although Meador’s (2003) analysis
suggests that this shift came somewhat earlier within
Protestantism, Kugelmann claims that the boundaries between psychology and religion began to weaken
in Catholicism primarily after 1960. Prior to that time,
although psychology was granted autonomy within the
church in matters of “fact” and “treatment” as long as it
didn’t contradict doctrine, Kugelmann cites Pope Pius
XII as limiting psychology’s role in what were considered
more foundational matters. The church maintained the
final word on “spiritual and moral issues” (p. 348) and on
such important doctrines as the nature of the soul. This
seems not unlike the current balance often hoped for, if
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then transformed such that they become described in
fully humanistic and materialistic terms, while psychology remains firmly grounded in naturalistic assumptions
(Reber, 2006; Slife & Whoolery, 2006). Psychology may
then leave theistic religion with what Morrison calls
“hardly more than a moralistic ghost” (Meador, 2003, p.
269) while itself remaining relatively unaltered by the encounter. This lopsided encounter may be largely due to
a widespread embracing of psychology by religion and a
highly limited embracing of religion by psychology.
So although this psychological bridge between secular and religious questions, between the subjective and
objective, between mind and body, between spirit and
matter, might have provided an opportunity for mutual
influence and dialogue, according to some theorists, religious ideas have tended to be distorted, subsumed,
replaced, or ignored in favor of naturalistic ideas when
it comes to the relationship between psychology and
religion (Bishop, 2007; Reber, 2006; Slife & Whoolery,
2006). The chasm between natural science and religion
has widened, with psychology making incursions into
religious territory while staying grounded in the assumptions of the new secularism, represented by naturalistic
(God-free) science.

a psychologist is expected to remain “objective,” “valuefree,” or “value-neutral.” Thus psychologists, no matter
how religious, are expected to eliminate or “control for” a
valuing of God’s influence in their research and practice
(Slife & Whoolery). It has been argued that the valuing
of value-freeness or value-neutrality pervades modern
secular education as well ( Johnson, 1995). This may be
due in part to the pervasive influence on public education of such notable psychologists as John Dewey and
Edward Thorndike, who both grounded their otherwise
contrasting theories in naturalistic assumptions that ignored the possibility of divine influence (Richardson &
Slife, 2013).
Similar to objectivism, the related notion of materialism assumes that what matters in psychological research
and therapy is the tangible, material, measurable, and observable (Slife & Whoolery, 2006). An example of this
view might be found in an assumption that mental experience, including religious experience, can be fully explained by efficient causal chemical activity in the brain
(Slife & Williams, 1995). Outside of neuroscience, even
the humanistic aspirations of describing and promoting
“higher” human experience often rely on material, observable operationalizations. These operationalizations
give constructs such as love, hope, faith, and divine inspiration a sense of empirical weight as encapsulated descriptions of behavior and emotion.
Furthermore, although humanism may soften the
deterministic assumptions of earlier schools of psychological thought, it may fail to fully extract itself from determinism, thus denying the value of human agency so
central to many religious people and to LDS doctrine in
particular. Humanistic determinism is notably manifest
in the assumption that an inborn actualizing tendency
drives much of human behavior, needs, and even desires
(Slife & Williams, 1995). Humanistic psychology also
typically retains assumptions of individualism and instrumentalism (Bishop, 2007), which may conflict with
such religious values as self-sacrifice and altruism.
Thus the meaning of spiritual and religious experience, as understood by many theists, may be distorted
by psychology to the extent that psychology retains
these naturalistic assumptions. What psychology typically gives us, then, may be at best an impoverished view
of religious and spiritual experience and at worst a view
that is completely disconnected from or even hostile to
that experience. Religious experiences of the divine are

Implications for the Religious Psychologist

The word “psyche” refers to the soul or spirit. As a study
of the spirit, then, psychology should ideally be situated at
the confluence of mind, spirit and body. It makes sense
that historically psychology was a center point for materialistic inroads into matters of mind and spirit. Unfortunately, with the adoption of strictly materialistic assumptions associated with the natural sciences, psychologists
created inroads with no outlets and thus a stagnating science of the mind.
However, the history of psychology’s largely one-sided
influence on religion might provide clues for how religion might inform psychology and, through psychology,
perhaps other sciences. By taking the spirit or soul that
should be the center of our discipline seriously, religious
psychologists might breathe some life (Gen. 2:7) into psychology and other sciences, which have otherwise tended
to focus primarily on the temporal and material elements
of experience—instead of allowing their understanding
of truth to being baptized in the acid (Meador, 2003) of
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a “one-sided [materialistic] dualism” (Bartlett, 2003; Slife
& Whoolery, 2006).
The influences of science on religion through the medium of psychology, as described here, involved first a
conceptual separation of the spiritual and material (described elsewhere as death) and then the purposive application of materialistic assumptions to the spiritual. The
reverse path might then involve a conceptual reunification of the spiritual and material (a type of at-one-ment,
or rebirth of the discipline) and a purposive consideration of spiritual assumptions when considering material
realities—which should now be seen as inseparable from
the spiritual. Religious psychologists, particularly LDS
psychologists, should take seriously the belief that “all
things…are spiritual” (D&C 29:34).
Historically, rationalism, with its emphasis on logical
truths, has both competed and cooperated with empiricism’s emphasis on learning through the physical senses.
The tenuous marriage between rationalism and empiricism in modern science has neglected a third element:
“heart,” or spirit. This third element (variously described
as intuition, insight, inspiration, and an innate moral
sense—and in LDS circles as the light of Christ) can
serve as a bridge between logic and the physical senses. It
is this element that often anchors truth when our minds
seem to tell us one thing and our physical senses seem to
tell us another. With spirit, our mind (intelligence) and
our bodies are united, our thoughts and physical senses
can be aligned, our outward behavior can be made consistent with our inward beliefs, and whole or complete
truth can be made manifest. Reliance on only one, or
even two, of these three gates to truth can lead to various
forms of error.
Whereas true religion should encompass all three elements, following the popularization of dualism and
an acidic baptism in psychology and other social sciences (e.g., education), religion has to a certain extent
relinquished its interest in temporal or material things
(such as a study of the body or brain and its senses and
a study of social processes), considering them primarily
“secular” concerns. However, this ignores that secularism
is no longer understood inclusively, and taking this exclusivity (separation) seriously inevitably tends toward a
dangerous redefinition of spiritual as things not relevant
to temporal life. Separated from spiritual understanding, the spiritual element found in temporal or physical
experiences is inevitably redefined in materialistic terms

(e.g., as purely biological, chemical processes originating in the brain, or as a social dynamic or construction).
This separation keeps the bridge functioning only in one
direction, if it functions at all. Eventually even belief in
God is redefined, for example, as simply a manifestation
of primal fear in the personal or collective imagination
(Dewey, 1934).
In spite of this weakening and constraining of the role
of religion, facilitating communion between mind and
heart (D&C 8:2), or reason and faith, continues to be
largely the domain of religion. It is in understanding and
facilitating communion between these elements and the
physical world—including physical senses and overt
behavior—that psychology might be of particular use.
With the separation of science and religion, psychology
attempted to keep a foot in both camps. Thus situated,
psychology could have been an ambassador for reunion,
or at least communion. Instead it became a “crypto-missionary” (Slife, Smith, & Burchfield, 2003) for naturalistic (God-free) science. Thus, it may be the responsibility
of religious psychologists to re-establish this communion
by being active ambassadors of mind and spirit to believers in a solely materialistic science—including clients
and students with such a one-sided orientation. Believing psychologists often have unique inroads into the scientific community, even in comparison to other believing
scientists, because we have a particular interest in matters
of the mind and spirit as well as the body and behavior.
It may be time for us to make better use of these opportunities.
However, this work of serving as ambassadors to the
scientific community might not alone be sufficient. We
might also be responsible for helping to repair some of
the damage to religious belief done historically by our
discipline. In this regard we might help religious people,
including many of our clients and students, remember that material things, such as the brain and body,
are also spiritual things—and the truths that govern
spiritual things also apply to these material elements.
In the modern sense of God-free secularism, there are
no secular topics or issues with which religious people
need not concern themselves. All things are spiritual.
In our theology, separation is often equated with death:
the separation of the body from the spirit and the spirit
from God. In some ways, this bridging of elements that
were formerly seen as separate and the seeking of unified truth—taking into consideration the relationships
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between mental, spiritual, and physical realities—might
itself be an important form of therapy as well as education. Our unique situation at the confluence of science
and religion, as well as our professional interest in mind,
spirit, and body, might allow the believing psychologist,
while certainly not supplanting the role of an ecclesiastical leader, to provide unique insights into these bridging
pathways. Such pathways need not be presented covertly,
as psychological “crypto-missionaries” (Slife, Smith, &
Burchfield, 2003) might at times have presented secular
values. They also need not be pushed on clients or students with evangelical zeal. Rather, they can be considered in open dialogue as alternatives to what has in many
ways become a lopsided influence: science on religion, or
body on mind. Psychology, in cooperation with spirit,
may help to balance the influence between these realities.
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a “one-sided [materialistic] dualism” (Bartlett, 2003; Slife
& Whoolery, 2006).
The influences of science on religion through the medium of psychology, as described here, involved first a
conceptual separation of the spiritual and material (described elsewhere as death) and then the purposive application of materialistic assumptions to the spiritual. The
reverse path might then involve a conceptual reunification of the spiritual and material (a type of at-one-ment,
or rebirth of the discipline) and a purposive consideration of spiritual assumptions when considering material
realities—which should now be seen as inseparable from
the spiritual. Religious psychologists, particularly LDS
psychologists, should take seriously the belief that “all
things…are spiritual” (D&C 29:34).
Historically, rationalism, with its emphasis on logical
truths, has both competed and cooperated with empiricism’s emphasis on learning through the physical senses.
The tenuous marriage between rationalism and empiricism in modern science has neglected a third element:
“heart,” or spirit. This third element (variously described
as intuition, insight, inspiration, and an innate moral
sense—and in LDS circles as the light of Christ) can
serve as a bridge between logic and the physical senses. It
is this element that often anchors truth when our minds
seem to tell us one thing and our physical senses seem to
tell us another. With spirit, our mind (intelligence) and
our bodies are united, our thoughts and physical senses
can be aligned, our outward behavior can be made consistent with our inward beliefs, and whole or complete
truth can be made manifest. Reliance on only one, or
even two, of these three gates to truth can lead to various
forms of error.
Whereas true religion should encompass all three elements, following the popularization of dualism and
an acidic baptism in psychology and other social sciences (e.g., education), religion has to a certain extent
relinquished its interest in temporal or material things
(such as a study of the body or brain and its senses and
a study of social processes), considering them primarily
“secular” concerns. However, this ignores that secularism
is no longer understood inclusively, and taking this exclusivity (separation) seriously inevitably tends toward a
dangerous redefinition of spiritual as things not relevant
to temporal life. Separated from spiritual understanding, the spiritual element found in temporal or physical
experiences is inevitably redefined in materialistic terms

(e.g., as purely biological, chemical processes originating in the brain, or as a social dynamic or construction).
This separation keeps the bridge functioning only in one
direction, if it functions at all. Eventually even belief in
God is redefined, for example, as simply a manifestation
of primal fear in the personal or collective imagination
(Dewey, 1934).
In spite of this weakening and constraining of the role
of religion, facilitating communion between mind and
heart (D&C 8:2), or reason and faith, continues to be
largely the domain of religion. It is in understanding and
facilitating communion between these elements and the
physical world—including physical senses and overt
behavior—that psychology might be of particular use.
With the separation of science and religion, psychology
attempted to keep a foot in both camps. Thus situated,
psychology could have been an ambassador for reunion,
or at least communion. Instead it became a “crypto-missionary” (Slife, Smith, & Burchfield, 2003) for naturalistic (God-free) science. Thus, it may be the responsibility
of religious psychologists to re-establish this communion
by being active ambassadors of mind and spirit to believers in a solely materialistic science—including clients
and students with such a one-sided orientation. Believing psychologists often have unique inroads into the scientific community, even in comparison to other believing
scientists, because we have a particular interest in matters
of the mind and spirit as well as the body and behavior.
It may be time for us to make better use of these opportunities.
However, this work of serving as ambassadors to the
scientific community might not alone be sufficient. We
might also be responsible for helping to repair some of
the damage to religious belief done historically by our
discipline. In this regard we might help religious people,
including many of our clients and students, remember that material things, such as the brain and body,
are also spiritual things—and the truths that govern
spiritual things also apply to these material elements.
In the modern sense of God-free secularism, there are
no secular topics or issues with which religious people
need not concern themselves. All things are spiritual.
In our theology, separation is often equated with death:
the separation of the body from the spirit and the spirit
from God. In some ways, this bridging of elements that
were formerly seen as separate and the seeking of unified truth—taking into consideration the relationships
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between mental, spiritual, and physical realities—might
itself be an important form of therapy as well as education. Our unique situation at the confluence of science
and religion, as well as our professional interest in mind,
spirit, and body, might allow the believing psychologist,
while certainly not supplanting the role of an ecclesiastical leader, to provide unique insights into these bridging
pathways. Such pathways need not be presented covertly,
as psychological “crypto-missionaries” (Slife, Smith, &
Burchfield, 2003) might at times have presented secular
values. They also need not be pushed on clients or students with evangelical zeal. Rather, they can be considered in open dialogue as alternatives to what has in many
ways become a lopsided influence: science on religion, or
body on mind. Psychology, in cooperation with spirit,
may help to balance the influence between these realities.

Jacoby, S. (2004). Freethinkers: A history of American secularism. New
York: Henry Holt and Company.
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